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INTRODUCTION 
The present paper aims to analyse the protection of environmental interests through 
the cases decided by the European Convention of Human Rights. The Convention 
does not include a right to a healthy environment. Still, in recent years the European 
Court of Human Rights has given a number of innovative judgments acknowledging 
applicants' causes of action in environmental cases. The new jurisprudence poses 
crucial questions on the interpretation of the Convention and admissibility 
requirements to bring a case to the Court. The paper will seek to offer an overview of 
these developments, starting from a general outline on the conceptual and legal 
linkage between human rights and environmental protection, giving an account of the 
Council of Europe's position on the matter. The analysis will then proceed to detailed 
review of the Court's jurisprudence in connection with each of the provisions that 
have found application in environmental cases. The conclusions will comment on the 
Court's role in the protection of environmental interests within the Member States of 
the Council of Europe. 
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1. The protection of the environment and human rights Haw 
The term environment refers to 'the surrounding conditions of something', typically 
entailing some relational significance. 1 The legal notion of environment varies from 
system to system. By way of abstraction, it is possible to say that environmental 
legislation pertains to different physical living and non-living entities, including air, 
land, water and wildlife. Most of these entities do not fall within proprietary schemes 
and have long been considered res nullius, characterised by open access, or res 
communes omnium, collectively owned and managed by a community, in a way that 
no single user could have exclusive rights to them.2 The protection of this kind of 
entities and the identification of subjects responsible for their care pose a series of 
legal questions. 3 Generally, governmental and administrative bodies are the main 
actors to this effect and private individuals only come into play in cases of direct 
interference with their personal spheres. An increasing number of legal systems, 
however, provide instruments of public participation in environmental decision-
making and adjudication, supplementing and scrutinising governmental action m 
environmental matters.4 The resulting legal framework is a complex system of 
criminal, civil and administrative law, both at domestic and international levels. 
The protection of the environment through legal means aims to ensure both the 
preservation of resources and the remedy of damage or loss. Preventive measures rule 
human activities through the use of command and control regulations and market-
based instruments, whereas remedial measures serve to identify the subjects 
responsible for recovery and the techniques to use for the purpose.5 
The protection of human rights is based on respect for human dignity. 6 There is no 
univocal notion of human rights. For simplification, human rights may be defined as 
most basic rights, pertaining to what is essentially human, thus assigning priority to 
'certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functioning 
of a human being. ' 7 The elaboration of the human rights doctrine has contributed to 
shifting the focus of international legal relations from the pursuit of States' self-
interest to a core of fundamental values, imposing limits on States' exclusive 
jurisdiction over their nationals.8 This has led to the introduction of numerous 
instruments for the monitoring, implementation and enforcement human rights, both 
at domestic and international levels. 
1 M. PRIEUR, Droit de I 'Environment, Paris, 1984, p. 4. 
2 J. VOGLER, The Global Commons, Liverpool, 2002, p. 4. 
3 On the subject, cf. G.W. HARDING, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968); J. SAX, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, in 68 Michigan Law Review, 471 
(1970); R.J. LAZARUS, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 71 Iowa Law Review 631 ( 1986); by the same author cf. also: Pursuing 'Environmental 
Justice': The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 New York University Law Review 787 
(1993). 
4 For an overview of these questions, see PRING, NOE', The Emerging International Law of Public Participation 
Affecting Global Mining, Energy and Resources Development, in Human Rights in Natural Resources 
Development, edited by ZILMAN, LUCAS, PRING, Oxford, 2002. 
5 For a general introduction on these notions, see D. WILKINSON, Environment and Law, London, 2002. 
6
-Cf. Freamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNG.A. Res. 21-7 A, UN, 1948. 
7 M. FREEDEN, Rights, Open University Press, 1991, p. 6. According to another definition, 'a human right by 
definition is a universal moral right. Something which all people everywhere at all times ought to have, something 
of which no one may be deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which is owing to every human 
being simply because he is human', cf. M. CRANSTON, What are Human Rights? London, 1973, p. 36. 
8 Cf. A. CASSESE, International Law, 2"d ed. 2005, p. 375. 
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The environment represents the precondition to all human activities and, arguably, a 
condicio sine qua non for numerous human rights.9 A link between human rights and 
the environment may therefore be derived from the very fact that human health and 
existence are dependent upon environmental conditions. 10 
The link between human right and environmental protection is justified by the intent 
of joining efforts. Both environmental and human rights protection strive to reduce the 
reserved dominion of States' jurisdictions at the international level and the 
unaccountability of governmental and private actors at the domestic level. 11 
Additionally, while improved environmental conditions may contribute to the 
fulfillment of human rights standards, the achievement of a high level of compliance 
with human rights law is susceptible of enabling better environmental protection. In 
the perspective of enforcement, human rights law supplies unique avenues of redress 
beyond national States that are so far unknown to international environmental law. 12 
Linking environmental and human rights protection may therefore create a forum for 
redress and precautionary remedies for victims of domestic environmental abuses. 
The first acknowledgement of this nexus came with the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
on Human Environment, according to which: 
'Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of l(fe, 
in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being and he 
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations.' 13 
In subsequent years, the United Nations established a subsidiary body by the General 
Assembly, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), with the scope to promote 
international cooperation in the field of environmental protection and provide general 
policy guidance for environmental programs within the UN system. 14 This mandate 
was later strengthened, as UNEP was also given the task of promoting cooperation on 
policy-making, monitoring, assessment and development of international 
environmentallaw. 15 
9 In the wording of Judge Weeramantry: 'the protection of the environment is likewise a vital part of contemporary 
human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights, such as the right to health and the right 
to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine 
all the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments' Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Dam Case, ICJ Rep. 1997, p. 7. 
10 For a comprehensive introduction on the interrelation between human rights, seeM. ANDERSON, A. BOYLE 
eds., Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996; A. SACHS, Eco-justice: Linking 
Human Rights and the Environment, Worldwatch Institute, 1995; R. PICOLOTTI, D. TAILLANT, Linking 
Human Rights and the Environment, Arizona, 2003. 
11 M. ANDERSON, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: an Overview, in M. ANDERSON, 
A. BOYLE eds., Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996, p. 2. 
12 In this respect, the Compliance Committee of the Meeting of the Parties to the UNECE Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(ECE/MP.PP/C.l/2005/2/Add.l, II March 2005) represents a most interesting and welcome novelty. 
13 
-'Declaration of the United Nations Conference ·on Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, UN Doc. 
A/CONF /48/ 14/REV. I, at Principle I. 
14 UN General Assembly Resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972. 
15 Cf. Agenda 21, adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) in 1992, at 
Chapter 38. Cf. also the Nairobi Declaration on the Role and Mandate ofUNEP, adopted by the UNEP Governing 
Council in 1997. 
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Today a large number of national, regional and international instruments stress the 
intrinsic relationship between the preservation of the environment, development and 
the promotion of human rights. 16 On the domestic side, more than 100 constitutions 
guarantee the right to a clean and healthy environment or the State 's obligation to 
prevent environmental harm. 17 At the international level, the formal recognition of 
specific environmental rights may be found in some UN documents 18 and regional 
instruments. 19 
The interrelation of human rights and environmental protection has been exemplarily 
embodied in the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 20 Article 1 of the 
Convention expressly provides a right to a healthy environment to present and future 
generations,21 requmng State Parties to introduce procedures supporting the 
development of environmental aims, articulated in three 'pillars': access to 
information, public participation and access to justice.22 The Convention represented a 
landmark in the attempt to join the protection of human rights and environmental 
protection and to date has 40 signatories and 36 ratifications. 
1n spite of these developments, the existence of a fundamental right to a clean 
environment in international law is controversial and not supported by any global 
human rights treaty. 23 1n the perspective of existing law, however, failure to provide 
16 Cf. Report of the Secretary General of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Science and Environment: 
Human Rights and the Environment as a Part of Sustainable Development, submitted in January 2005, according 
to which: 'since the World Summit on Sustainable Development, there has been growing recognition of the 
connection between environmental protection and human rights', cf. E/CNo.4/2005/96, p.2 
17 The list includes the constitutions of: Afghanistan Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cambodia, Capo Verde, 
Chad, Chechnya, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea (draft), Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sao Tome and Principle, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and Zambia. 
18 Cf. e.g. UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, 46'h Session, Review of Further Developments in the Fields with which the Sub-
Commission has been concerned, Human Rights Environment, Final Report prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini, 
Special Rapporteur, E/CNo.4/Sub.2/1994/Conv. I, 13 (1994). 
19 Cf. Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights, 21 ILM 1982, 52, entered into force 21 Oct. 1986, at Article 
24; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 'Protocol of San Salvador,' O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), at Article II; Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
38 ILM 1999, 517, hereinafter Aarhus Convention, entered into force on 30 October 200 I, at Article I. 
10 ECE/CEP/43 adopted on 25 June 1998 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and entered 
into force on 30 October 200 I. The Convention was prepared in the framework of the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe and to date has 40 signatories and 36 ratifications. 
21 To this end, Article I makes express reference to 'the protection of the right of every person of present and 
future generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being'. Furthermore, the 
Preamble to the Convention expressly elaborates the idea that 'every person has the right to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her well-being and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to protect and 
improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations'. 
22 Cf. Article I: 'Each Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-
making and access to justice in environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this Convention'. 
23 The only human rights treaty of universal application making reference to environmental protection, the 
Convention on the Right of the Child, makes only a passim reference to it and does not embody a distinct right to a 
healthy environment. Cf. Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force 
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protection to the environment may result in the violation of some human rights whose 
realisation depends upon certain environmental characteristics. A number of human 
rights have been invoked to vindicate environmental abuses, in an attempt to mobilise 
and interpreting them to address environmental issues, which could not have been 
anticipated when they were formulated. Thus the implementation of existing human 
rights obligations may ensure better environmental protection, as a logical corollary 
of human rights protection.24 
The Convention system and the admissibility criteria of access to the Court 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is one of numerous international instruments aimed at the protection of 
human rights. It was prepared within the framework of the Council of Europe and to 
date it has been ratified by 46 countries, including all Member States of the European 
Union. 25 • 
The Convention is regarded as the Council of Europe's most significant achievement 
in the defence and promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It sets 
out a list of rights and freedoms that Parties are obliged to guarantee to everyone 
within their jurisdiction. The Convention is assisted by a Court empowered to ensure 
the observance of the engagements undertaken by its Parties. The declaration of a 
violation of the Convention has the effect of imposing legal obligations on respondent 
States to put an end to the breach and restore the pre-existing situation.26 The unique 
feature of the system, distinguishing it from other human rights treaties, is that, if this 
is not possible, the Court may also awardjust satisfaction to the injured party.27 This 
confers on the Court far more persuasive powers than its homologues, both in the 
perspective of redress to victims and pursuit of compliance. In this way the Court 
operates to supplement national measures and as a stimulus to preemptive action by 
States in order that they fulfill their co-operative obligation. 
The Court may be accessed both by States and individuals. In order to bring a claim to 
the Court, the latter need to be in a position to consider themselves victims of a 
violation of one of the rights listed in the Convention.28 
According to the Court's established case law, the term victim denotes 'the person 
directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the 
Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice. ' 29 Applicants must be 
victims at the time of application, proving a sufficient link with a violation of the 
Sept. 2 1990, at Article 24: 'State parties will pursue the full implementation of this right (the right to health) 
taking into consideration the dangers and the risks of environmental pollution'. 
24 Cf. M. ANDERSON, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: an Overview, in M. 
ANDERSON, A. BOYLE eds., Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996, p. 8. 
25 To the date of writing, the State Parties to the Convention are: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; 
Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; 
Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; The Netherlands; Norway; Poland; 
Portugal; Romania; Russian Federation; San Marino; Serbia and Montenegro; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine; UnitedKingdom. 
26 Article 46 of the Convention. 
27 Article 41 of the Convention. 
28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1953, Article 19. 
29 Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, at 36. 
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Convention. The term individual refers to any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of 
the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto. ' 30 The system does not allow actio popularis31 and associations may submit 
claims only if they can prove to have directly suffered a violation of one of the rights 
listed in the Convention that is applicable to them. 32 
There are no restrictions as to the nationality of applicants, but the violation must be 
imputable to a State that has ratified the Convention and, equally, applicants must be 
within the jurisdiction of one Contracting Party. However, the Court's jurisdiction 
extends also to extra-territorial acts carried about by State agents, provided that they 
exercised either authority or control over the individual or the territory at Issue, 
(competence ratione loci). 33 
The exercise of the right of individual petition may not aim to prevent a violation of 
the Convention. Only in exceptional circumstances may the mere risk of violation 
confer the status of victim on an individual applicant, namely in presence of 
reasonable and convincing evidence of the occurrence of a violation concerning him 
or her personally.34 The existence of prejudice is relevant only to the purpose of 
compensation. 
The ratification by all States of Protocol No. 14 to the Convention will substantially 
amend the admissibility criteria of access to the Court. The implementation of the 
Protocol will allow the Court to declare inadmissible the claims of applicants who 
have not suffered a significant disadvantage, as far as the case has been duly 
considered by a domestic tribunal and unless respect for human rights requires 
examination of the application on the merits. 35 
The system is subsidiary to the operation of domestic remedies and the primary 
responsibility for the protection of human rights falls on national authorities. Thus in 
order to access the Court, applicants are required to have previously exhausted the 
domestic remedies available to pursue breaches of their rights under the Convention.36 
However, this requirement may be waived in absence of adequate and effective 
domestic remedies. 37 
Applications need to be filed within a period of six months from the date on which the 
final domestic decision was taken (competence ratione temporis). The Court does not 
consider anonymous applications or applications pertaining to matters that are 
substantially the same as those already examined by the Court or through another 
procedure of international litigation. 
30 Ibidem, at 34. 
31 Klass and others v. Germany, Application No. 5029/71, at 33. 
32 Such as, for instance, the right to a fair trial, (cf. Gorraiz Lizzaraga and others v Spain, Application No. 
62543/00), but not the right to respect of their home and family life, (cf. Asselbourg v Luxembourg, Application 
No. 29121/95). 
33 Loizidou v Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, at 52. 
34 CfAorexample Soering v UK, Application No. 14038/88; Dudgeon v UK, Application No. 7525176; Norris v 
Ireland, Application No. 105871/83, Modinos v Cyprus, Application No. 15070/89. 
35 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending 
the control system of the Convention, Council of Europe Treaty Series, No. 194, 13 May 2004. 
36 Cf. Article 35 of the Convention. 
37 Cf. Yasa v Turkey, Application No. 22495/93, at 77. 
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Judgments declaring a violation of the Convention have the effect of imposing on the 
respondent State a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and to take the 
measures it considers most appropriate to restore the pre-existing situation (restitutio 
in integrum).38 If this is not possible, the Court may award just satisfaction to the 
injured party. 39 The term just satisfaction refers to measures that remedy a breach of 
an obligation in order to 'afford the injured party such satisfaction as appears to it to 
be appropriate' when there is no possibility for restitution.40 In urgent cases, the Court 
may resort to special interim measures 'in the interests of the parties or of the proper 
conduct of the proceedings before it. ' 41 The measures may be adopted by a Chamber 
of the Court or by its president, at the request of a party or of any other person 
concerned, but may also be prompted by the Court proprio motu. The deployment of 
interim measures is subordinate to the establishment of a prima facie case under the 
Convention and to the existence of the threat of imminent and irreparable harm of a 
very serious nature. In such circumstances, State Parties must comply with the 
measures and refrain from any act or omission that could 'undermine the authority 
and effectiveness of the final judgment. ' 42 
The judgments of the Court are essentially declaratory43 and, in line with the 
subsidiariness of the system, the Court does not have powers to proceed to the 
implementation of its decisions, which is left to domestic authorities. Nevertheless, 
when States fail to take action, the Court has undertaken the practice of commenting 
on systematic violations of the Convention.44 Furthermore, according to the new 
regime that will come into force with the ratification of Protocol No. 14 to the 
Convention, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe will be empowered 
to refer recalcitrant States to the Court.45 
The debate within the Council of Europe 
The European Convention of Human Rights does not provide a right to a clean 
environment. Over the years, however, the Council of Europe has promoted some key 
instruments for international environmentallaw46 and environmental protection is one 
of its areas of action. A first suggestion for the inclusion of the right to a healthy and 
viable environment in the Convention came in 1999, when the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe proposed to 'consider the feasibility of drafting an 
38 Cf. Scozzari Giunta v Italy, Application No. 39221/98 and 41963/98, at 249: 'a judgment in which the Court 
finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded 
by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general 
and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation 
found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects'. 
39 Ibidem, at 250. 
40 Papamichalopoulos v. Greece Application No. 14556/89, at 34. 
41 Rules of the Court No. 39. For an example of the employment of such measures, cf. Soering v UK, Application 
No. 14038/88 and, more recently, Ocalan v Turkey, Application No. 46221/99. 
42 Cf. Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey [GC], Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, at 110. 
43 Cf. Assanidze v Georgia, Application No. 71503/0 I, at 202. 
44 Cf. for instance to the Court's attitude towards the length of proceedings in Italy, as it established that there was 
a practice in violation of the Convention, cf. Bottazzi v Italy, Application No. 34884/97, at 22. 
45 Cf. Article 16 of the Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, 13 May 2004. 
46 Cf. Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, 1979, E. T. S. I 04; IEL-MT 
979: 70; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment: 
Lugano, ETS No. 150, not in force, 2l.VI.l993; Convention on the Protection of the Environment through 
Criminal Law (Strasbourg, 1998). ETS No. 172, Strasbourg, April II, 1998. 
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amendment or an additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning the right of individuals to a healthy and viable environment.' 47 
The Committee of Ministers, however, rejected the suggestion, as at that time 'the 
conditions were not ripe to initiate a study geared to drawing up such a right for 
inclusion in an additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights'. 48 
In this regard, the Committee pointed out that other international instruments 
pertaining to the enforcement of environmental law, such as the Convention on the 
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, the Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment and the 
Aarhus Convention had not yet entered into force. 
In 2003, after the entry into force of the Aarhus Convention, a new report of the 
Council of Europe Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and 
Regional Affairs suggested the preparation of an additional Protocol to the European 
Convention, containing express recognition of a right to a healthy, viable and decent 
environment.49 This suggestion was endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly, which 
expressly called for the Committee of Ministers to 'draw up an additional Protocol to 
the European Convention on Human Rights concerning the recognition of individual 
procedural rights intended to enhance environmental protection, as set out in the 
Aarhus Convention'. 50 The Recommendation further requested the Committee to draw 
up an instrument setting out the ways in which the European Convention on Human 
Rights provided individual protection against environmental degradation.51 
The suggestion was unfavourably received by the Council of Europe Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, which warned that 'adding an individual right to a 
healthy, viable and decent environment to the European Convention could turn out to 
be counter-productive', as the formulation and implementation of such a right posed 
questions that seemed of difficult, if not impossible solution. 52 
This caveat did not remain unheard and was fully endorsed by the Committee of 
Ministers. 53 Although they acknowledged the importance of a healthy, viable and 
decent environment to the protection of human rights, the Ministers did not consider it 
appropriate to draft an additional Protocol to the Convention. They agreed with the 
Committee that the Convention system already indirectly contributed to the protection 
of the environment through existing rights and their interpretation in the case law of 
47 Recommendation 1431, adopted on 4 November 1999, published in Official Gazette of the Council of Europe, 
November 1999. 
48 Reply to Recommendation 1431, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 November 2000. 
49 Document 9791 ofthe Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 16 April2003. EDOC 9791. 
50 Recommendation 1614 (2003), 27 June 2003, at 10. 
51 Ibidem, at 10. 
52 Opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 9833, 19 June 2003, EDOC 9833, at 3. The 
Committee furthermore observed that: 'If we give citizens a broadly formulated individual right to a healthy 
environment without being more specific as to the basis on which and against whom a citizen can in fact make a 
claim arising from that right, it becomes difficult for a judge to adjudicate. For what can the- already overloaded-
Court in Strasbourg do if a citizen complains that the air or the water in his country is polluted, citing against the 
respondent state his or her general right to a healthy environment? The Court would not be able to condemn the 
respondent government in a general way and would in most cases have no guidelines as to the specific measures it 
could require of that country. The broadly formulated right does not define them, with the result that the type and 
extent of remedy cannot clearly be determined. It would thus be impossible to evaluate execution of judgments.' 
Cf. also ibidem, at 5. 
53 Reply of the Committee of Ministers to Recommendation 1614 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly, adopted 
at the 8691h meeting of the Ministers' deputies on 21 January 2004. 
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the European Court of Human Rights. 54 The Committee further Stated that the Court's 
jurisprudence was likely to continue evolving, 'making it not advisable to draft an 
additional Protocol to the Convention along the lines set out in the Assembly's 
Recommendation'. 55 
The Committee, however, recognised that action needed to be taken in order to seek 
'new ways in which the human rights protection system can contribute to the 
protection of the environment. ' 56 Accordingly, it gave mandate to the Steering 
Committee of Human Rights to draft an instrument recapitulating the relevant rights 
as interpreted in the Court's case-law and emphasising the need to strengthen 
environmental protection at national level, 'notably as concerns access to 
information, participation in decision-making processes and access to justice in 
environmental matters '. 57 
The result of this work was approved by the Committee of Ministers in January 2006, 
with the publication of the Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, containing 
the principles emerging from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.58 
The Manual's declared aim is to 'raise awareness of the existing case-law of the 
Court in environmental matters and of the need to strengthen the protection of the 
environment at national level ( ... ), helping potential applicants to better assess 
whether their claims relating to the environment would be arguable before the 
Court.' 59 
The Manual's introduction highlights the link between the protection of human rights 
and the environment, stating that the two are 'mutually reinforcing 160 and emphasising 
that 'effective enjoyment of the rights which are encompassed in the Convention 
depends notably on a sound, quiet and healthy environment conducive to well-
being'. 61 The Manual does not affect member States' current obligations' and 
explicitly recalls that the principle of subsidiariness is particularly important in the 
context of environmental matters.62 
With the Manual the Committee of Ministers seems to have endorsed the line taken 
with the new jurisprudence of the Court, attempting to systematise it. This may prove 
a turning point in the pursuit of environmental interests, making of the Court a 
subsidiary remedial mechanism for the protection of the environment in the Member 
States of the Council of Europe. Set aside the perspective of introducing a specific 
human right to a healthy environment, the Committee of Ministers has therefore left it 
to the Court to establish the circumstances under which environmental interests may 
obtain protection within the framework of the Convention. The present paper will 
54 Opinion of the Steering Committee for Human Rights, adopted at the 56th Meeting of the Committee in 
Strasbourg, on 18-21 November 2003. 
55 Ibidem, at 4. 
56 CM/860/21 012004, adopted on 23 January 2004. 
57 Ibidem. 
58 Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, containing the principles emerging from the case law of the 
·European Court of Human Rights, available on www.coe.i1\t. 
59 Cf. Final Activity Report of the 61" Meeting of the Steering Committee for Human Rights on Human Rights and 
Environment, p.2. 
6° Cf. Manual, p. I. 
61 Cf. Manual, p. 2. 
62 Ibidem. 
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seek to shed some light on the steps taken by the Court in this direction, starting from 
its early case law. 
The Court's initial approach: the early case law 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, 63 although the European Convention of Human 
Rights does not contain any explicit reference to the environment or to environmental 
rights, its Court has increasingly found itself dealing with applications presenting 
clear environmental features. In this connection, two different scenarios may be 
configured. The human rights protected by the Convention may be directly affected 
by adverse environmental factors or the protection of the environment may be 
regarded as a general interest justifying interference in the exercise of some human 
rights. 
In the first perspective, the prov1s1ons susceptible of being directly affected by 
environmental conditions are the right to life (Article 2), to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence (Article 8) and to the peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention). The procedural 
guarantees offered by the right to a fair trial (Article 6) and to effective remedy 
(Article 13) may also be called into question for the protection of environment 
interests. 
In the second perspective, on several occasions the Court has established that 
environmental interests may offer legitimate grounds for interference with rights 
enshrined in the Convention, especially with reference to the right to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence and the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions.64 
The present Author considers that the analysis of this jurisprudence has little effect on 
the assessment of the range of remedies that the European Convention of Human 
Rights may offer to the protection of environmental interests. The cited case law 
therefore will not be analyzed in this paper,65 which will instead focus on cases where 
the protection of Convention rights requires a certain quality in environmental 
conditions. 
Initially the Court had a fairly restrictive approach to this kind of claims and 
applications based on these grounds were rejected as incompatible with the 
Convention ratione materiae. In the words of the Commission, 'no right to nature 
preservation is as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention '. 66 
63 Cf. p. 7. 
64 Thus in the case of Fredin v Sweden, the Court found that the revocation of a licence to exploit a gravel pit on 
the applicant's property represented a justified interference witH his proprietary rights for reasons of public 
interest, acknowledging that 'in today's society the protection of the environment is an increasingly important 
consideration'. Cf. Fredin v Sweden, Application No. 12033/86, at 48. 
65 For a detailed analysis of this case law, cf. D. GARCIA SAN JOSE, Environmental Protection and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2005. 
66 Kyrtatos v. Greece, Application No. 41666/98, at 52. 
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The first claim touching upon environmental interests to be declared admissible by the 
Strasbourg institutions was that of Arrondelle v UK. 67 On that occasion, the applicant 
complained that the noise produced by Gatwick airport and a nearby motorway 
seriously affected her health, breaching her right to respect for her home and private 
and family life. She further complained that domestic law prevented her from acting 
in nuisance, which was prohibited for noise caused by aircraft in flight or aerodromes. 
This limit, the applicant maintained, constituted a violation of her rights under 
Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. Mrs. Arrondelle also submitted that the domestic 
authorities' refusal to grant her a permission to change the destination of the premises, 
from domestic to commercial, did not allow her to sell the house at a reasonable price, 
affecting her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The 
Commission declared the application admissible, but the case was settled and was 
never decided on its merits. 
The first claim bearing some environmental implications to reach the Court was 
another noise pollution case. In Powell and Rayner v UK_68 the applicants lived near 
Heathrow airport and claimed that the noise pollution caused by aircraft amounted to 
a violation of the rights under Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention. The applicants further complained that they had not had any access to 
effective domestic remedies, with breach of their rights under Article 6 and 13. The 
Commission considered that the existence of large airports was necessary to the 
country's economic well-being and that the interference with the applicants' rights 
was legitimate and justified. In the other hand, the case was found to be admissible on 
grounds of Article 13. 
The Court observed that Article 8 was material to the applicants' claim as the quality 
of their private life and the scope of enjoying the amenity of their homes had been 
adversely affected by the noise generated by Heathrow airport. 69 However, the Court 
gave a preponderant importance to the fact that the UK Government had adopted 
measures to minimise noise and compensate the affected subjects, in the pursuit of a 
legitimate aim. The Court found that domestic authorities had not failed to strike a fair 
balance between the interests at stake. In this respect, the Court added that 'this is an 
area where the Contracting Parties are to be recognised as enjoying a wide margin of 
appreciation. >?o Accordingly, the Court concluded that there had be no violation of 
Article 13. 71 
In its first decision on a case bearing substantial environmental implications the Court 
chose to grant a wide margin of appreciation to State authorities as to how best 
address the issue of noise pollution. The Court proved itself unwilling to enter into 
considerations relating to the merits of domestic policies, showing high deference to 
the national authorities' approach. This view seemed to make the way to Strasbourg 
very steep for environmental cases. In the following years, however, the Court would 
substantially revise its approach to the question. 
67 Arrondelle v UK, Application No. 7889/97. 
68 Powell and Rayner v UK, Application No. 9310/81. 
69 Powell and Rayner v UK, at 40. 
70 Powell and Rayner v UK, at 44. 
71 Powell and Rayner v UK, at 45. 
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2. The use of Article 8 and the right to respect for one's home, 
private and family life 
According to Article 8 ofthe Convention: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There will be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interest of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The general purpose of Article 8 is to secure a sphere within which every individual 
may freely pursue the fulfilment and development of his private life and physical 
well-being, extending to cover the sites where these take place. The norm protects the 
individual against arbitrary interference, both by public authorities and private 
individuals. Protection is not limited to the Anglo-American notion of privacy and 
confidentiality, but includes physical intrusion and other forms of immaterial 
interference, such as noise, emissions and smells.72 
States should not only refrain from interfering with individual rights, but are also 
under the positive obligation to take active steps to safeguard them, particularly where 
interference derives from lack of legislation or monitoring on intrusive activities. 73 In 
this respect, the provisions under Article 8 have been interpreted as including a series 
of procedural guarantees requiring authorities to prevent violations and sanction those 
responsible. 74 
These rights are not absolute and allow for a series of limitations, as specified in the 
second paragraph of Article 8. Accordingly, when interfering with private or family 
life, national authorities must act in accordance with domestic law and for the pursuit 
of a legitimate aim. In addition, their decisions must be proportionate to this 
legitimate aim and a fair balance be struck between competing interests. 
In assessing claims under this provision, the Court first of all considers whether the 
facts of the case may be said to pertain to one of the protected interests, i.e. home, 
private life, family life and correspondence. Private life refers to the intimate sphere 
of a person's physical, psychological and moral integrity, including relational and 
sexual life. 75 The notion of family life encompasses protection and respect for family 
relations based on biological ties, although de facto families are also included. 76 The 
concept of home has been interpreted to extend to spaces where a person's private and 
family life takes place, i.e. the home and places of residence in general, including the 
72 Cf. Moreno Gomez v Spain, Application No. 4143/02, at 53. 
73 Cf. Manual on Human Rights and the Environment approved by the Committee of Ministers on 20 January 
-2006; p. 37. . .. 
74 Cf. e.g. McMicheal v UK, Application No. 16424/90, at 87: 'whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural 
requirements, the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and such as to afford 
due respect to the interests safeguarded by Article 8.' 
75 Cf. X andY v The Netherlands, No. 8978/80, at 22. 
76 Cf. Hokkanen v Finland Application No. 19823/92; Boyle v UK, Application No. 9659/82. 
13 
workplace. 77 The right to respect for the home not only includes the right to the 
physical area, but also to its quiet enjoyment. The protection of correspondence 
pertains to the protection of communication lata sensu. 
Having identified the relevant interest, the Court goes on to establish the content of 
the States' obligations with reference to the specific facts of the case. These may 
entail a duty to abstain from interference (so-called negative obligation) or to 
establish means of protection (so-called positive obligation), even in relations 
between individuals. 78 In both contexts, the Court requires that States strike a 'fair 
balance between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a 
whole. ' 79 The tests that the Court deploys to verify compliance with these two sets of 
obligations bear some significant differences. 
When the Court envisages a breach of a negative obligation, the interference with the 
applicant's right is assessed in the light of the parameters listed under the second 
paragraph of Article 8. The Court typically proceeds to ascertain whether the 
interference was in accordance with the law, requiring a minimal standard for the 
legislation de qua, which needs to be accessible and formulated in an intelligible 
manner. 80 The Court then considers whether the interference pursued an aim that 
could be regarded as legitimate according to the list given in Article 8, which includes 
national security, public safety and the economic well-being of the country. The Court 
further establishes whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society, i.e. 
whether the State has struck a fair balance between the competing interests on the 
facts of the case. To this purpose, the Court may take into consideration the 
alternative means that could have been employed to protect the interest at stake; 
whether the aim pursued has been achieved; whether the decision process that led to 
the interference could be regarded as fair and whether its consequence were 
adequately monitored. 81 
On the other hand, when the Court considers that a positive obligation is at issue, it 
firstly proceeds to determine the content of the specific duty incumbent upon the State 
and only then assesses whether domestic authorities have complied satisfactorily with 
it. In this sense, the requirements of respect are not clear-cut and vary significantly 
from case to case. Additionally, the Court requires States to identify a pressing social 
need which justifies the interference. To this end, the listing of legitimate aims under 
Article 8 provides some guidance, but it is not attached with overarching 
importance.82 In the context of positive obligations, therefore, States bear the 
additional burden of proving that they have exercised their powers with due respect of 
all the interests involved. 
77 Cf. Niemietz v Germany, Application No. 13710/88, at 30 and, more recently, Societe Colas Est and others v. 
France, Application No. 37971/97, at 40-41. 
78 X andY v The Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80, at 23. 
79 Cf. Powell Rayners v UK, cit., at 41: 'Whether the( .. ) case be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State 
to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants' rights under graph I of Article 8 (art. 8-1) or 
in terms of an 'interference by a public authority' to be justified in accordance with graph 2 (art. 8-2), the 
arplicable principles are broadly similar., 
8 Cf. Sunday Times v UK (No. I), Application No. 6538/74, at 49. 
81 Cf. P. LEACH, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford, 2"d ed., 2005, p. 284. 
82 Cf. Rees v UK, Application No. 9532/81, at 37: 'in striking the balance the aims mentioned in the second 
paragraph of Article 8 may be of a certain relevance, although this provision only refers in terms to "interferences" 
with the right protected by the first paragraph - in other words is concerned with the negative obligations flowing 
therefrom.' 
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For both sets of obligations, States enJOY a certain margin of appreciation m 
determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with their obligations, m 
compliance with the principle of subsidiariness assisting the Convention. 83 
The enjoyment of the right to respect for one's home, private and family life may be 
decisively impaired by environmental conditions and this is the provision of the 
Convention that has been more successfully deployed for the pursuit of environmental 
interests. The jurisprudence on this matter is well-established. In the years, the Court 
has found that severe environmental pollution such as excessive noise levels,84 fumes, 
smells85 and toxic emissions86 may interfere with a person's peaceful enjoyment of his 
home, in such a way as to raise an issue under Article 8. The key precedent that 
marked the evolution in the Court's jurisprudence in this sense was the case of L6pez-
Ostra v Spain. 
L6pez-Ostra v Spain 87 
In L6pez-Ostra v Spain the applicant was a Spanish citizen residing in Lorca. Mrs 
L6pez-Ostra complained that the operation of a private plant for the treatment of 
liquid and solid waste within a distance of 12 meters from her home had resulted in a 
violation of her rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 
The plant had been built in a residential area without the licence required by domestic 
legislation for activities causing nuisance. At its very opening, the release of gas, 
fumes and pestilential smells had caused health problems and nuisance to a number of 
local residents. The local authorities had evacuated the area and temporarily rehoused 
its inhabitants. As a result of the incident, the activities of the plant were partially 
restricted. Nevertheless, reports drawn by domestic environmental and health 
authorities established that the plant continued releasingfumes, smells and emissions, 
in breach of the standards prescribed by domestic regulations. 
The applicant had filed a complaint with the local administrative court, asking for the 
closure of the plant. She argued that the operation of the plant unlawfully interfered 
with the enjoyment of her home, threatening her physical and psychological integrity, 
contrary to her constitutional rights. The applicant had argued that her daughter had 
been suffering from nausea, vomiting, allergic reaction and anorexia, which her 
paediatrician linked to the high pollution levels at her family home.88 Also the 
applicant's nephew, who lived in the same premises, was diagnosed with pathologies 
related to the chronic absorption of the pollutants released by the plant. 
The local administrative court rejected the applicant's claim, maintaining that the 
nuisance she suffered did not constitute a serious risk to her health and was not 
sufficient to infringe her constitutional rights. Mrs. L6pez-Ostra appealed against this 
83 Cf. retro, p. 6. 
84 Hatton and others v UK, App. No. 36022/97, cf. infra. 
85 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Application No. 16798/90, cf. infra. 
86 Guerra and others v Italy, Application No. 14967/89. 
87 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, Application No. 16798/90. 
88 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, at 19. 
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decision and further attempted to submit the question to the Spanish Constitutional 
Court, but both applications were rejected. 
Meanwhile, the applicant's sisters-in-law had filed an administrative complaint and 
started criminal proceedings against the company running the plant, arguing that it 
had operated in breach of national regulations, committing environmental offences. 
Although the domestic courts had ordered the closure of the plant, their orders had 
been suspended and the relative proceedings were still pending as the European Court 
for Human Rights considered Mrs. L6pez-Ostra' s claim. In the meantime, the 
applicant and her family had permanently moved to another area of the city at their 
own expense. 
Before the Court, Mrs. L6pez-Ostra maintained that the local authorities' inactivity 
had resulted in a violation of her rights under Article 8. She also claimed that being 
compelled to live near the plant amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under 
Article 3. The Government opposed these claims, submitting that the fact that the 
applicant had moved away from the area affected by nuisance excluded her status as a 
victim of a violation of the Convention. The Commission considered the case 
admissible only on grounds of Article 8, as the circumstances of the case were not as 
severe as to justify a claim under Article 3. The Court agreed with these findings, 
observing that 'naturally, severe environmental pollution may affect an individual's 
well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect 
their private and family life adversely'. 89 
The Court observed that the operation of the plant raised serious issues on the respect 
of the applicant's home and family life, constituting an interference with her rights 
under Article 8. As the legitimacy of the operation of the plant was still under the 
consideration by the national courts, the Court did not pronounce itself on the matter. 
However, the Court asserted that, independently of the outcome of the domestic 
proceedings, it was within its competence to establish whether national authorities had 
taken the measures necessary to protect the applicant's rights. 90 
In this respect, the Court noticed that, although the plant was privately owned, the 
local council had subsidised it. Furthermore, it found that the local authorities were 
aware of the nuisance caused to local residents. In the Court's opinion, the measures 
taken to compensate for the applicant's distress for exposure to the nuisance produced 
by the plant had been too little. Domestic authorities had therefore played an active 
role in prolonging the nuisance suffered by the applicant, who had been forced to 
remedy the situation by moving at her own initiative. This set of circumstances 
inclined the Court to conclude that there had been a breach of the applicant's rights 
under Article 8. 
The Court considered that the applicant had suffered relevant pecuniary loss due to 
the depreciation of her old flat, as well as the expense and inconvenience related to 
her relocation. Taken together with the distress and anxiety the applicant had suffered 
and the harm to her daughter's health, the Court awarded an equitable compensation 
of 4 millions pesetas, both as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 91 
89 L6pez-Ostra v Spain, at 51. 
90 Lopez Ostra v. Spain, at 55. 
91 L6pez-Ostra v Spain, at 65. 
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This decision marked an innovative opening to environment-related claims in the 
Court's jurisprudence. Although it did not expressly State whether the respondent 
State was under a positive obligation to protect the applicant's rights, the Court's 
reasoning clearly shows that the State had a positive duty to protect Mrs. L6pez-Ostra 
and had failed to do so. The Court did not scrutinise the domestic legality of the 
interference since domestic proceedings were still pending at the time of its decision. 
Nevertheless, the Court established that the applicant had carried a disproportionate 
burden for the operation of the plant, which had not been duly compensated by 
domestic authorities. 
The circumstances of the case differed significantly from those of Powell and Rayner 
v UK, as Mrs. L6pez-Ostra was able to prove substantial inadequacy in the action 
taken by domestic authorities, whereas the same could not be concluded in the case of 
Messrs Powell and Rayner. The individual consequences to the applicant's personal 
sphere were also more serious in L6pez-Ostra v Spain, as a result of the damage to her 
daughter's health. Additionally, the latter presented fairly localised conflicting 
interests, while the operation of Heathrow airport purportedly related to the economic 
well-being of the whole country. 
The L6pez-Ostra v Spain judgment seemed to set a threshold of acceptability for the 
burden that some community members were meant to carry for the common interest. 
The shift of responsibility for private nuisance operating in this decision would bear 
substantial implications for future case law under Article 8, opening the way to 
extensive positive obligations on the part of State Parties. 
The decision, however, remained isolated for a few years, during which the Court 
delivered some controversial judgments on environment-related cases seeking to rely 
on other provisions of the Convention ( cf. e.g. Balmer-Schafroth and others v 
Switzerland, infra, Chapter 4). In 1998 the Court took another crucial decision under 
Article 8, with the case of Guerra and others v Italy. 
Guerra and others v Italy92 
In Guerra and others v Italy, the applicants were 40 Italian citizens living near a 
chemical factory, complaining that domestic authorities inertia in reducing pollution 
levels and hazards arising from the operation of a privately owned chemical plant had 
breached their rights to life and physical integrity and the quiet enjoyment of their 
home.93 
The plant was classified as high risk under domestic law and released various toxic 
pollutants.94 In the 70's an accident had caused 150 cases of acute poisoning in the 
neighbouring population. A subsequent expert report had found that the plant had 
been operating without the required Environmental Impact Assessment and that its 
equipment for emission treatment had not complied with domestic law. The plant had 
subsequently restricted its production to fertilisers and had been reclassified as 
dangerous under domestic law. Domestic authorities had issued orders prescribing a 
92 Guerra and others v Italy, Application No. 14967/89. 
93 Guerra and others v Italy, at 35. 
94 Directive 82/50 1/EEC of the Council of the European Communities. 
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series of safety improvements to the plant. In 1994 the plant ceased to operate, save 
for the annexed power station and waste treatment facilities. 
Back in 1985, some 420 local residents, including the applicants, had initiated 
criminal proceedings against 7 directors of the plant for offences relating to pollution 
caused by emissions from the factory and to non-compliance with a number of 
environmental protection regulations.95 Only 2 of the directors had been convicted and 
ordered to compensate for the damage suffered by the civil parties. However, this 
decision had been overturned on appeal, by reasons of the delay and uncertainty 
associated with the implementation of the relevant domestic regulations, which were 
considered decisive to clearing the appellants of all charges. 
In the their application to the European Court of Human Rights the applicants 
submitted that the lack of practical measures to reduce pollution levels and the 
hazards related to the operation of the factory had breached their right to life, contrary 
to Article 2 of the Convention.96 They also complained that the authorities' failure to 
inform them of the risks and of the procedures to follow in event of a major accident 
had breached their right to freedom of information under Article 10.97 
The Commission declared the case admissible, observing that Article 10 'should be 
interpreted as granting an actual right to receive information, in particular from the 
competent authorities, to persons from sections of the population which have been or 
may be affected by an industrial or other activity dangerous to the environment.' 
In their memorandum to the Court and at the hearing, the applicants further relied on 
Article 8 of the Convention, contending that the domestic authorities' failure to 
provide them with the relevant information had breached their right to respect for 
their home, private and family life. 98 
The Court disagreed with the extensive interpretation of Article 10 given by the 
Commission, finding that this provision did not impose any positive obligation upon 
States to collect and disseminate information of their own motion.99 Nevertheless, the 
Court found that the applicants' claim was admissible under Articles 8 and 2. The 
Court established that the toxic emissions from the plant were capable of interfering 
with the applicants' right to respect for their private and family life. 100 The Court also 
observed that, although domestic authorities were not directly responsible for the 
emissions, they had failed to spread information which was material to the protection 
ofthe applicants' rights. 101 Consequently, the Court concluded there had been a breach 
of that provision and granted non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 10.000.000 Lira 
for each applicant. 
The Court did not find it necessary to consider the matter also on grounds of Article 2. 
This finding was the object of two separate opinions, in which one dissenting judge 
observed that 'it may be the time for the Court's case-law on Article 2 to start 
95 Guerra and others v Italy, at 19. 
96 Guerra and others v·Jtaly, at 35. 
97 Ibidem. 
98 Guerra and others v Italy, at 46. 
99 Guerra and others v Italy, at 53. 
100 Guerra and others v Italy, at 60. 
101 Ibidem. 
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evolving, to develop the respective implied rights, articulate situations of real and 
serious risk to life, or different aspects of the right to life'. 102 
As in L6pez-Ostra v Spain, the Court confirmed that severe environmental pollution 
might be relevant to the rights protected under Article 8, reiterating that State 
authorities may bear responsibility for interferences caused by private activities. In the 
present decision, the Court concluded that States' positive obligations also included 
the dissemination of information that might enable individuals to assess the risks of 
living near a hazardous site. 103 In this regard, the Court confirmed its established line 
according to which the protection of private and family life may entail the right to 
access to information. 104 In the Guerra decision, however, the Court further recognised 
that public authorities have an obligation to secure a right to access to information in 
relation to environmental issues. 105 In the specific, the Court noted that the State 
authorities' duty to protect the applicants included informing them of the risks to 
which they were exposed by living near a chemical factory. 106 
This feature would be confirmed in subsequent case law. 107 Nevertheless, the Guerra 
judgment remained isolated, as the Court adopted an increasingly restrictive approach 
to environmental claims. 
A good example of the Court's approach can be envisaged in the decision of 
Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg. 108 In that case, 78 Luxembourg citizens and the 
association Greenpeace had claimed that the nuisance produced by a newly-built steel 
plant had breached their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The applicants had 
unsuccessfully tried to oppose the plant's opening before domestic courts. In their 
submissions to the European Court of Human Rights, they had maintained that the 
operation of the plant had caused various forms of nuisance, including intolerable 
smells and ground contamination by heavy metals. The applicants claimed that the 
resulting damage to the environment had affected their quality of life and deprived 
them of the peaceful enjoyment of their homes (or of their registered office in the case 
of the association Greenpeace). 109 They further complained that they had not had 
access to a fair trial under domestic law, with breach of their rights under Article 6 of 
the Convention. 
The Court considered that Greenpeace could not claim to be a victim of a breach of 
Article 8, as this provision did not apply to associations. As to the other applicants, 
the Court found that they had tried to use domestic proceedings to prevent a violation 
of Article 8, rather than to put an end to it. The Court repeated that the exercise of 
individual petition could not aim to prevent a violation of the Convention, save in 
exceptional circumstances, where applicants were to produce 'reasonable and 
convincing evidence of the probability of the occurrence of a violation concerning 
them personally: mere suspicions or corijectures are not enough.' 110 
102 Cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jambrek. 
103 Guerra and others v Italy, at 60. 
104 Gaskin v UK, Application No. 10454/83. 
105 Oncry•ld1z v.~Turkey;cat 90 and Guerra and others v. Italy, at 60 
106 Guerra and others v Italy, at 60. 
107 Case of McGinley and Egan v. UK, Application. Ns. 21825/93; 23414/94, at 101. 
108 Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg, Application No. 29121/95. 
109 Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg, at I. 
110 Ibidem. 
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On the facts of the case, the Court observed that the mere mention of the pollution 
risks did not justify the applicants' submission that they were victims of a violation of 
the Convention. The Court elaborated that, instead, applicants should have been able 
to assert, arguably and in a detailed manner, that 'for lack of adequate precautions 
taken by the authorities, the degree of probability of the occurrence of damage was 
such that it could be considered to constitute a violation of their rights, on condition 
that the consequences of the act complained of were not too remote.' 111 
In the Court's opinion, the applicants had produced little evidence of the nuisance 
complained of and the causal link with harm to their quality of life. The Court 
furthermore noted that the applicants had not attempted to access the domestic 
remedies that would have enabled them to complain of the verifiable consequences to 
their health and quality of life resulting from the start of the steel production.112 
Accordingly, the Court declared the claim manifestly ill-founded. 
In this decision, the Court took a fairly restrictive approach to the notion of victim. 
The standard of proof required was very high, as the Court was not satisfied with the 
mere possibility of damage in the applicants' personal sphere, rejecting their attempt 
to use the right of individual petition to prevent a violation, rather than to put an end 
to it. In this respect, the Court also seemed to require detailed evidence of the 
nuisance complained of, its intensity and its causal link with the applicants' quality of 
life. These criteria were applied to numerous other cases, particularly in the context of 
Article 6. 113 In the meantime, another environmental case gained the spotlight in 2001, 
with the case of Hatton and others v UK. 
Hatton and others v UK114 
The case of Hatton and others v UK concerned nuisance caused by the operation of 
Heathrow airport. As mentioned earlier in this paper, 115 the Court had already had 
occasion to pronounce itself on interferences with the rights under Article 8 caused by 
the operation of airports. 116 The case of Hatton and others, however, presented the 
peculiarity of dealing with the specific issue of the implementation of new flight 
regulations, which had allegedly led to an increase in the number of flights, with 
consequent sleep disturbance. As a consequence, the applicants claimed that they had 
suffered interference with their rights under Article 8, further complaining that they 
had not had access to an effective domestic remedy, contrary to Article 13 of the 
Convention. 
According to the information before the Court, the drafting of the new flight scheme 
had been accompanied by a series of consultation papers and a research study on the 
health consequences of sleep disturbance. Some local authorities had also tried to 
oppose the implementation of the new scheme through judicial review. 
111 Ibidem. Cf. also, mutatis mutandis, Soering v. UK, Application No. 14038/88, at 85. 
112 Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg, at I. 
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115 Cf. retro, p. II. 
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The applicants maintained that, after the implementation of the new scheme, the level 
of noise disturbance was significantly higher than recommended by the World Health 
Organization. 117 They asserted that the interference with their rights was not necessary 
in a democratic society, as the Government had not produced any assessment of the 
specific economic importance of night flights, 118 nor it had carried out adequate 
studies on the health impact of sleep prevention. 119 
The applicants further submitted that the interference with their rights was not in 
accordance with the law, as the new scheme had not been accessible and its 
consequences had not been foreseeable. Furthermore, the applicants maintained that 
the new regulations had not fulfilled the aim of keeping the levels of night nuisance 
below those set by previous regulations, as Stated in the preceding Consultation 
Paper. 120 By reference to the Court's decision in Guerra and others v Italy, the 
applicants also claimed that they had not had access to essential environmental 
information regarding the extent of an environmental threat to their moral and 
physical integrity, with consequent breach of their civil rights under Article 8. 121 
The Government submitted that the applicants were exposed to lower noise levels 
than applicants who had been unsuccessful in their complaints relating to the 
operation of Heathrow airport. 122 They further maintained that the operation of 
privately-owned airports was matter upon which the Court's established jurisprudence 
granted a wide margin of appreciation to national authorities. 123 Furthermore, the 
Government submitted that night flights were of fundamental importance to the 
economic well-being of the country124 and that the night flight scheme had been 
tailored to meet the needs of the local population, as well as the funding of studies on 
sleep disturbance. 125 
The Court preliminarily distinguished the instant case from previous decisions 
relating to generic complaints on noise pollution caused by the operation of Heathrow 
airport, observing that the controversy related to the specific issue of the increase in 
night noise due to the implementation of the new regulatory scheme. 126 
The Court accepted that the facts of the case constituted an interference with the 
applicants' right to respect of their home and private life. The Court also 
acknowledged that the nuisance was not directly imputable to the British authorities 
as the airport was privately run. However, the Court established that domestic 
authorities still had the positive duty to protect the applicants' rights. In identifying 
the content of this duty, the Court observed that 'in the particularly sensitive field of 
117 Hatton and others v UK, at 76. 
118 Hatton and others v UK, at 78. 
119 Hatton and others v UK, at 77. 
120 Hatton and others v UK, at 80, '(the applicants) contended that, in order to be 'in accordance with the law', 
there must be protection in domestic law against arbitrary interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 8 § I 
of the Convention; the law must be accessible and its consequences must be foreseeable. These features were not 
present when the Government departed from its statement of policy 'not to allow a worsening of noise at night and 
ideally to improve it' (the 1993 Consultation Paper, graph 34) and was held by the High Court to have been 
'devious' in its attempt to conceal the departure'. 
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environmental protection, mere reference to the economic well-being of the country 
would not be sufficient to outweigh the rights of others.' 127 
The Court agreed with the applicants that the Government had not produced any 
assessment of specific economic benefits related to night flights and to the harm 
associated with sleep prevention, rather than sleep disturbance. In analysing the 
practical steps taken by the Government to mitigate night noise, the Court asserted 
that they had been 'too modest' to satisfy the positive obligation to protect the 
applicants' rights. 128 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Government had failed 
to strike a fair balance between competing interests, with violation of the applicants' 
rights under Article 8. 129 
The Court further found that there had been a breach of the applicants' rights under 
Article 13. In this regard the applicants had submitted that they had not had had 
access to an effective remedy, as national legislation excluded resort to the tort of 
nuisance for noise caused by aircraft. The applicants maintained that the only remedy 
to which they could theoretically have resorted was judicial review. However, they 
protested that the scope of this instrument was limited to the grounds of irrationality, 
unlawfulness or unreasonableness, making it inadequate to addressing complaints 
under the Convention. 130 The Government, on the other hand, submitted that, as the 
applicants did not have an arguable claim under Article 8, they had no right to a 
remedy. 131 Even if the Court should conclude the contrary, the Government argued 
that the remedy of judicial review could be considered adequate to the purposes of 
Article 13. 132 
The Court found that, as the applicants had suffered for a breach of their right under 
Article 8, they evidently had an arguable claim under Article 13. The Court agreed on 
the unsuitability of judicial review as a remedy in accordance with Article 13 and 
concluded that there had also been a violation of the applicants' right under this 
provision and awarded them £4.000 each for non-pecuniary damage. 
In this decision the Court endorsed the line elaborated in L6pez-Ostra v Spain, firmly 
placing on the State the onus to justify interference with the rights under Article 8 for 
activities carried out by third parties. In explicating the content of the State's positive 
obligation, the Court seemed to go as far as to recognize an implicit duty to make use 
of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, as it observed that: 
'States are required to minimise, as far as possible, the interference with these rights 
by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims 
in the least onerous way as regards human rights. In order to do that, a proper and 
complete investigation and study with the aim of finding the best possible solution 
which will in reality strike the right balance should precede the relevant project.' 133 
127 Hatton and others v UK, at 97. 
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The Court exercised a close scrutiny on the domestic authorities' choices in their 
implementation of the obligations under Article 8. The legitimate aim pursued was 
not considered sufficient to justify the disproportionate burden that the applicants had 
carried on behalf of the whole community. 
The Court's decision was welcomed as an opening to 'more generous compensation 
to be paid to those disproportionately affected by development, thus reflecting more 
fully the environmental costs of certain economic choices' .134 Indeed here the Court 
for the first time contested the merits of domestic policies, analysing in great details 
the measures deployed by national authorities. This was a revolutionary approach to 
environmental claims. The reaction to the decision was equally clamorous. 
The case was referred to a Grand Chamber upon request of the British Government as 
a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention. In particular, the 
recurrent State argued that the Third Section's close scrutiny on domestic regulations 
had reduced to vanishing point the States' margin of appreciation in an area involving 
difficult and complex balancing of a variety of competing interests and factors. 135 
Before the Grand Chamber the applicants reaffirmed their initial submissions, 
maintaining that State authorities were to be allowed a narrow margin of appreciation 
in connection with the pervasive interference with the rights under Article 8 
associated with sleep deprivation. 136 
The Grand Chamber preliminarily observed that, although the Convention did not 
include a right to a clean and quiet environment ex se, where individuals were directly 
and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue might arise under Article 
8. 137 The Court further stated that the same provision applied to environmental cases, 
both whether pollution was directly caused by the State or whether State 
responsibility rose from failure to properly regulate private industry. 138 In this context, 
the Court used the term 'environmental cases' to refer to cases 'involving State 
decisions affecting environmental issues' .139 
As to the substance of the Governmental policies, the Grand Chamber asserted that 
the implementation of the new flight Scheme 'was susceptible of adversely affecting 
the quality of the applicants' private life and the scope for their enjoying the amenities 
of their respective homes' .140 The Court further found that, although the applicants had 
not submitted any evidence of the degree of discomfort they suffered, a study 
commissioned by domestic authorities had acknowledged that sensitivity to noise 
included a subjective element, a small minority of people being more likely than 
others to be woken or otherwise disturbed in their sleep by aircraft noise at night. 141 
Consequently, the Court found that there had been an interference with the applicants' 
rights under Article 8. 
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The Court did not consider it necessary to establish whether the facts of the case 
pertained to a breach of a negative or a positive obligation, pointing out that, in both 
cases, the question was rather whether a fair balance had been struck between the 
competing interests of the affected individuals and of the community as a whole. 142 
Making reference to previous cases in which environmental questions had given rise 
to violations of the Convention, 143 the Court emphasised that the violation had been 
predicated 'on a failure by national authorities to comply with some aspects of the 
domestic regime'. 144 This element of domestic irregularity was deemed to be 'wholly 
absent' in the instant case and the Court further stressed that the applicants had not 
disputed the legality of the new flight scheme. It is however worth noticing that the 
latter finding was inaccurate as, in their submissions to the Chamber the applicants 
had expressly maintained that 'the interference with their rights was not in 
accordance with the law', due to the unintelligibility of the new regulations and the 
unpredictability of their effects. 145 These submissions had not been given detailed 
consideration by the Third Section and the Grand Chamber seemed to ignore them. 
The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the country's economic well-being 
represented a legitimate aim, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 8. In 
this respect the Grand Chamber further observed that the economic importance of 
night flights could not be disputed. The Court remarked that, on the other hand, the 
applicants had not proved of having suffered any financial loss associated with the 
implementation of the new scheme. Additionally, they could have left the affected 
area and moved somewhere else, with no adverse consequences to the value of their 
homes. 
The Court pointed out that the parties had displayed a different understanding of the 
national authorities' margin of appreciation. On this issue, the Court asserted that, on 
the facts of the case, there was no reason to depart from the normal rule of deference 
to State s' margin of appreciation, as 'it would not be appropriate ( ... ) to adopt a 
special approach by reference to a special status of environmental human rights'. 146 
In the light of these considerations, the Grand Chamber concluded that no issues arose 
as to the substantial aspect of Article 8. 147 
On the procedural side, the Grand Chamber preliminarily observed that governmental 
decision-making process concerning complex issues of environmental and economic 
policy must necessarily involve appropriate investigations and studies in order to 
allow them to strike a fair balance between the various conflicting interests at stake. 148 
The Court was satisfied that the Government had carried about a consistent 
investigation in preparation of the flight scheme, which had been preceded by a public 
consultation and had been closely monitored in its implementation. Consequently, the 
Grand Chamber found that there had been no breach of Article 8 on the procedural 
side. 149 
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However, the Grand Chamber established that the case was arguable for purposes of 
Article 13 and, like the Third Section, equally considered that judicial review was 
inadequate to remedy the applicants' situation. Accordingly, the Grand Chamber ruled 
that there had been a breach of Article 13 without awarding any damage to the 
applicants, as it found that the decision in itself constituted adequate satisfaction for 
the non-pecuniary damage they had suffered. 
The ruling was by a majority. In their lengthy opinion, the dissenting judges argued 
that there had been a violation of Article 8, maintaining that, although the Convention 
did not include a specific right to a clean environment, the question of environmental 
pollution was a par excellence issue for international law and that environmental 
protection shared common grounds with the general concern for human rights. 150 
The dissenting judges also criticised the majority's interpretation of the State 's 
margin of appreciation. They considered that the disturbance suffered by the 
applicants was particularly severe, sleep deprivation having been acknowledged as an 
element of inhuman and degrading treatment in the Court's jurisprudence. 
Additionally, the dissenting judges observed that the fact that the applicants 
represented a small minority of the population residing near Heathrow airport made 
them deserve special protection and not the other way around. 
Many commentators considered this decision a regress from the position taken in 
L6pez-Ostra v Spain and Guerra and others v Italy, saluting it as the end of the 
Court's special approach to environmental rights 151 and as 'a step backward in terms 
of the development of human rights in the environmental context.' 152 
The present author respectfully disagrees with this early reading of the Grand 
Chamber's decision. The Hatton and others v UK judgment did not close the Court's 
door to environmental claims, but simply set the pace of its future approach. An 
attentive reading of the decision reveals that here for the first time the Court took the 
opportunity to show that, for Article 8 to be applicable, the domestic legality of the 
disputed policy was to be attached with fundamental importance. This may seem a 
Statement of the obvious, given the wording of the second paragraph of Article 8. 
Nevertheless, the Court had not had occasion to elaborate on these matters in Guerra 
and others v Italy and L6pez-Ostra v Spain. In the latter, the Court even abstained 
from pronouncing on the legality issue, albeit it must have indirectly taken it into 
consideration. 
In Hatton and others v UK, the Third Section established that there had been a breach 
of Article 8 by reference only to one of the applicants' submissions, (i.e. the 
Government's failure to assemble the evidence as it would have been necessary for 
the decisions to be made on the basis of the relevant data), without analysing the 
others. 153 In particular, no specific consideration was given to the allegations 
concerning the domestic legality of the regulations, which were later found decisive 
15° Cf. Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Ttirmen, Zupan and Steiner. 
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by the Grand Chamber. In this, the Grand Chamber seems to have taken the 
reasonable standpoint that, in matters having prevailing environmental relevance - and 
therefore not directly protected by the Convention ex se - the legality of domestic 
practices at the centre of the dispute must be granted priority importance. 
As the new flight scheme did not display any prima facie arbitrariness, the Grand 
Chamber rightly attached relevance to the public consultations that had preceded its 
implementation, emphasising how the applicants had not presented any objections to 
it. Accordingly, the Court did not find that there were any issues as to the procedural 
correctness of the new regulations. The ratio of the Grand Chamber's reasoning may 
be easily traced to the subsidiariness principle assisting the Convention. 
The Dissenting Judges and some early commentators seem to have exaggerated the 
significance of the fact that the applicant represented a very small minority of 
residents in the Heathrow area. If the British authorities ought to be criticised at all, it 
should have been for not providing any remedy for the characteristic way in which the 
applicants had been affected by the implementation of the regulations, (e.g. monetary 
compensation, rehousing on favorable terms, etc), rather than disputing the policy of 
allowing night flights at all. In this, both the Third section and the Grand Chamber 
were right in finding a violation of Article 13. 
The fact that the applicants had not pointed to any specific pecuniary damage related 
to the implementation of the scheme and, equally, that they had failed to produce any 
specific evidence as to the damage to their health and well-being, were given crucial 
importance in the Grand Chamber's judgment. According to the Court's well-
established jurisprudence, applicants do not need to prove damage in order to be 
considered victims in Convention terms. 154 Nevertheless, it seems that, in the context 
of the environmental cases, the Grand Chamber required that some form of prejudice 
be configurable. In other words, it seems that, faced with significant challenge of 
setting the requirements to identify a victim in the specific field of environmental 
cases, the Court concluded that lack of material prejudice, together with the 
procedural correctness and legality of the disputed policy, was material to the finding 
of a breach of Article 8. 
The Hatton judgment synthesised most of the principles elaborated by the Court in 
environmental cases. All the key issues raised in the Grand Chamber decision - i.e. 
the domestic legality and the procedural correctness of the disputed policy, as well as 
the relevance of the personal impact on the applicants to constitute their status as 
victims - would face substantial developments in the following years. 
The 2004 evolution: the new case law under Article 8 
The Hatton and others v UK decision seemed to put a definitive halt to the pursuit of 
environmental interests through Article 8 of the Convention. This was confirmed in 
2003 by the decision in Kyrtatos v Greece. 155 The applicants were two Greek citizens 
who owned a property near a natural reserve, arguing that the building of an urban 
development adjacent to their home had led to the destruction of their physical 
154 Cf. Amuur v. France, Application No. 19776/92, at 36 
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environment, impairing their rights under Article 8. 156 In particular, the applicants 
complained that the area had lost its scenic beauty and changed profoundly in 
character from a natural habitat for wildlife to a tourist development. They further 
submitted that this deterioration of the environment had adversely affected their lives 
and that domestic authorities had failed to fulfill their positive duty to take reasonable 
and appropriate measures to secure their rights. 
The Court considered that the deterioration of the natural environment and landscape 
were not pertinent to the interests protected under Article 8. 157 The Court clarified its 
view maintaining that the crucial element which must be present in determining 
whether environmental pollution adversely affected the rights under this norm was the 
existence of a harmful effect on a person 's private or family sphere and not simply the 
general deterioration of the environment. 158 The Court further Stated that neither 
Article 8 nor any other Article of the Convention was specifically designed to provide 
general protection of the environment as, to that purpose, other international 
instruments and domestic legislation were more pertinent. 159 
Therefore, in the Court's opinion, although some disturbance could be associated with 
the urban development in the applicants' neighbourhood, this had not reached a 
sufficient degree of seriousness to be taken into account for purposes of Article 8. 160 
This decision confirmed the Court's strict interpretation of the victim requirement in 
connection with environmental cases, requiring that applicants prove immediate and 
considerable prejudice in order to constitute their claims. In 2004, however, this line 
saw substantial development in Taskin and others v Turkey. 
Taskin and others v Turkey161 
In Taskin and others v Turkey the applicants were 1 0 Turkish nationals complaining 
that the operation of a mine had forced them to suffer the consequences of 
environmental damage, threatening human health, wildlife and water supplies, with 
breach of their rights to life and respect of their home and family life. The applicants 
also claimed that they had not been able to access effective judicial protection, in 
breach of their rights under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. 162 
The mine was situated near the village where the applicants resided and operated gold 
extraction through cyanide leaching. According to the information before the Court, 
cyanide is an extremely toxic substance that, mixed with soil, water and air, becomes 
harmful to all living beings, presenting considerable risk to human health and the 
environment. 163 The mine had initially received permissiOn to operate after a 
procedure including an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and public 
consultation. 
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A number of local residents, including the applicants, had opposed the permit through 
judicial review. The Turkish Supreme Administrative Court had held that the permit 
conflicted with the State's obligation to protect the right to life and the right to a 
healthy environment enshrined in the Turkish Constitution. Accordingly, it had 
annulled the permit as contrary to public interest. 164 The Turkish executive, however, 
had issued a new permit, without requiring a new EIA. The mine had thereafter 
resumed its operations and never stopped since. 
The applicants and other local residents had successfully sued for damage the Prime 
Minister and other members of the executive for failing to enforce the first decision of 
the Supreme Administrative Court. Additionally, they had also opposed the new 
permit through judicial review, leading to a legal dispute that was still pending at the 
time of the hearing in Strasbourg. 
Before the Court the applicants submitted that, since the mine had started operating, 
they had suffered significant psychological distress associated with the risk posed to 
their health by the use of cyanidation. They further complained of the noise pollution 
associated with the movement of people and use of machinery and explosives. The 
applicants also maintained that, although the domestic courts had upheld their 
complaints, the executive had disregarded their decisions. In the light of these 
premises, the applicants asked the European Court of Human Rights to declare that 
the national authorities' decision to issue a permit to the operation of the mine, 
together with the related decision-making process, had given rise to a violation of 
their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 165 
The Government disputed that there had been an interference with the applicants' 
rights, since the risk they had complained of was extremely remote and not 
susceptible of posing a real threat to them. The Government further argued that, even 
if the Court should find Article 8 to be applicable to the facts of the case, this 
interference was to be regarded as fully legitimate, justified and proportional. 
The Court preliminarily recalled that severe environmental pollution might affect 'the 
individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as 
to adversely affect their private and family life, without, however, seriously 
endangering their health.' 166 The Court asserted that these considerations applied also 
to cases where the dangers of an activity had been determined in an environmental 
impact assessment, otherwise States' positive obligations to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to secure the applicant's rights under Article 8 would have been 
set at nought. 167 
The Court relied on the findings of the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court to 
establish that the use of sodium cyanide represented a threat to the environment and to 
the right to life ofthe neighbouring population. 168 Accordingly, the Court asserted that 
there had been an interference with the applicants' rights. 
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On the substantive side, the Court endorsed the Turkish Supreme Administrative 
Court's findings that the national authorities' decision to allow the operation of the 
mine had not served the public interest and had been contrary to the applicants' 
constitutional rights. The Court, however, did not draw any adverse conclusion from 
these facts and proceeded to examine the procedural correctness of the domestic 
authorities' conduct. 169 
In this regard, the Court observed that, although Article 8 did not include any explicit 
procedural guarantees, still the decision-making process leading to measures of 
interference had to be fair and capable of affording due respect to the interests of the 
individual. 170 The Court also recalled the principles established in Hatton and others v 
UK, asserting that the determination of environmental policies required appropriate 
investigations and studies 171 and emphasising the importance of public access to 
information. 172 The Court also recalled that access to court was necessary to the 
protection of the rights safeguarded by Article 8. 173 
The Court found that the executive authorities had disregarded the Turkish Supreme 
Administrative Court decision, allowing the operation of the mine without any 
substantial amendment to the material situation. The subsequent long dispute 
concerning the lawfulness of these measures 'was caused solely by the authorities 
refusal to comply with the courts' decisions and with domestic legislation' .174 The 
Court concluded that the State authorities' conduct had denied the guarantees 
provided by Turkish law of any effect, breaching their positive obligation to protect 
the applicants' rights. 
The Court further established that failure to comply with the Supreme Administrative 
Court judgment had breached the applicant's rights under Article 6. 175 The Court did 
not find it necessary to consider the case also on grounds of Articles 2 and 13. The 
decision was unanimous and the applicants were granted 3,000 EUR each for non-
pecuniary damage. 
The Taskin case broke new grounds at several levels. This was the first decision after 
Hatton and others v UK in which the Court found a breach of Article 8 in connection 
with a claim involving substantial environmental interests. The breach of the 
applicants' rights was the result of lack of compliance with domestic regulations and 
the Court did not proceed to assess the adequacy of domestic standards, as they had 
not been implemented in the first place. 
The Court relied heavily on the findings of domestic courts, both as to the risks posed 
by the operation of the mine and the finding that its operating permit 'did not serve 
the public interest'. Translated in Convention terminology, this remark sounded as if 
the interference with the applicants' rights was not in accordance with the law and 
necessary in a democratic society. The Court, however, did not draw any conclusions 
from this point, preferring to proceed to the analysis of the case according to the 
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procedural guarantees under the Convention. Also in this respect, the Court attached 
preponderant weight to the fact that the breach of the applicants' rights had been 
established in several domestic decisions. In the Court's view, the executive 
authorities' refusal to comply with these judgments had shown contempt for the 
applicants' rights, amounting to a procedural breach of Article 8. 
The most salient feature of the decision, however, lies in its effect on the victim 
requirement under Article 34 of the Convention. 176 Although the applicants did not 
sustain any actual damage to their health or property, the mere potential was sufficient 
to constitute a violation of their rights. This distinguishes the instant judgment from 
the circumstances of L6pez-Ostra and Guerra, where actual episodes of intoxication 
had taken place. 
The Court's change of attitude may be better appreciated by taking into account its 
established case law on analogous matters. In the past the Court had required that 
applicants be able to assert 'arguably and in a detailed manner, that for lack of 
adequate precautions taken by the authorities the degree of probability of the 
occurrence of damage is such that it can be considered to constitute a violation, on 
condition that the consequences of the act complained of are not too remote'. 177 
This attitude was well portrayed in the decision in Tauria and others v France, 178 
where the applicants sought to oppose the resumption of atomic testing in French 
Polynesia, submitting that nuclear activity severely affected their life and health. The 
Commission struck out the claim, concluding that the applicants could not be 
regarded as victims under the Convention, as they had not produced any detailed 
evidence that the tests had affected them personally and directly. In the cases of 
L6pez-Ostra v Spain and Guerra and others v Italy, the Court granted redress to 
applicants who could prove a breach of domestic standards together with some 
damage to their property and health. In the Taskin judgment, instead, the Court found 
that the breach of domestic standards was sufficient to encompass a violation of the 
applicants' rights, without requiring any proof of material prejudice. As recalled 
earlier in this paper, applicants may be considered victims under the Convention also 
in connection with the mere potential of damage to their personal sphere. 
Nevertheless, this was the first time the Court applied the preventive approach to an 
environmental case. 
The Taskin judgment that the principles elaborated in the cases of L6pez-Ostra and 
Guerra had not been overruled by the Grand Chamber's decision in Hatton and others 
v UK. On the contrary, it displayed a further enhancement of the protection of 
environmental interests under the Convention. This trend was confirmed by the 
Court's decisions in the following months. 
Moreno Gomez v Spain 179 
In Moreno Gomez v Spain, the applicant lived in a residential neighbourhood crowded 
with nightclubs, causing disturbance to the local population. The applicant, who 
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177 Asselbourg v Luxembourg, Application No. 29121/95, at I. 
178 Tauria and others v France, Application No. 28204/95. 
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suffered sleep deprivation, insomnia and 'other serious health problems,' argued that 
domestic authorities were responsible for the noise, constituting a breach of her rights 
under Article 8. 
Domestic authorities had tried to remedy the situation, banning the concession of new 
licences for the opening of nightclubs and categorising the area as acoustically 
saturated. The ban, however, had not been enforced and noise levels continued 
exceed the limits, a nightclub even receiving licence to operate in the very premises 
where the applicant lived. The domestic courts had later declared the licence invalid. 
Ms Moreno Gomez had complained to the local authorities, seeking compensation for 
the damage suffered and the costs of installing double-glazing, relying upon the right 
to life and physical integrity and the right to privacy and inviolability of the home, as 
provided by the Spanish Constitution. Since the local authorities had not replied to her 
claim, Mrs. Moreno Gomez lodged an application for judicial review for breach of her 
constitutional rights. Her claim was however unsuccessful, as the domestic courts 
found that she had not established a direct link between the noise and the alleged 
damage, failing to prove a breach of her fundamental rights. 
Before the European Court of Human Rights, Mrs. Moreno Gomez argued that the 
Spanish authorities' inertia had contributed to the interference with her rights under 
Article 8. She further maintained that the interference with her right had been 
unjustified, as the area where she lived was categorised as residential and no 
fundamental interests prevented the effective enforcement of existing legislation. 180 
The Government maintained that they were not responsible for disturbance carried out 
by private parties and added that the local authorities had sought to remedy the 
acoustic pollution affecting the applicant's place. Furthermore, they disputed that the 
applicant's claim relied in principle on noise levels that had not been measured within 
her home, but in the entrance of the hall of residence where she lived. 181 
The Court preliminarily observed that Article 8 entails the quiet enjoyment of the 
home and that, in this respect, the breach of this right also includes non concrete or 
physical intrusions, such as noise, emissions, smells or other forms of interference. 182 
The Court noted that domestic authorities could not be regarded as the direct cause of 
the noise pollution affecting the applicant. However, the fact that the area where she 
lived had been designated acoustically saturated was considered sufficient to exempt 
her from having to prove a fact of which the authorities were 'already officially 
aware. ' 183 In the Court's opinion, although the local municipality had taken some 
action to remedy the situation, they had tolerated continuing infringements of the 
standards set by domestic law, thus contributing to the practice of non-observance of 
the rules established to tackle the problems of night disturbance. The Court therefore 
found that domestic authorities had failed to protect the applicant's rights under 
Article 8 and awarded 3.884 EUR for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 
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In this judgment the Court resumed the line adopted in L6pez-Ostra v Spain, 
acknowledging a claim based on the breach of domestic regulations accompanied by 
material prejudice to the applicant's personal sphere. It is notable that, as in L6pez-
Ostra, the domestic courts had not offered any redress to the complaints of the 
applicant. There was accordingly a marked difference from the Taskin case, where the 
executive had disregarded the domestic courts' decision. In this respect, the Court 
seems to have instituted a twofold approach: it was ready to go against the domestic 
courts' assessment in cases of actual prejudice to the applicants' personal sphere, 
while it was reluctant to depart from it in cases of pure moral distress - e.g. Balmer-
Schafroth and others v Switzerland, 184 Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg. 185 
In Moreno Gomez v Spain, the Court further acknowledged that noise pollution is a 
source of interference relevant for the purposes of Article 8. In this respect, the Court 
was not satisfied by the mere predisposition of standards in domestic legislation and 
demanded also their effective implementation. This approach would see a further 
evolution in the following year, with the revolutionary decision of the case of 
Fadeyeva v Russia. 
Fadeyeva v Russia186 
In the Fadeyeva case, the applicant complained of a violation of her rights under 
Article 8 in relation to domestic authorities' failure to resettle her outside of the 
sanitary security zone of an iron smelter. 187 
Mrs. Fadeyeva lived in the sanitary security zone of the largest iron smelter in Europe. 
The factory produced vast amounts of pollutants, breaching domestic safety 
regulations and severely impacting the life and health of local residents. Since the 
Soviet era, domestic legislation prohibited any human settlement within a distance of 
1 km from the smelter (the so-called sanitary security zone), in order to isolate it from 
residential areas and reduce its impact on the health of local population. However, at 
the date of the proceeding, approximately 150.000 people, including the applicant, 
lived in the housing situated therein. The local concentration of toxic substances 
consistently exceeded the levels set by national legislation and the morbidity rate was 
higher than average. 188 The highest levels of contamination were registered in the 
residential districts immediately adjacent to the plants, where Mrs. Fadeyeva lived. 
According to domestic law, the authorities could discontinue the operation of a plant 
whose management failed to create a sanitary security zone in accordance with the 
law. 189 However, there was no requirement for the resettlement of local residents in 
the case of plants already in operation before the passing of the law. 190 In general, 
domestic legislation allowed the population to live temporarily in environmentally 
unfavorable territories, if State or public interests required that economic or other 
activities be conducted there. 191 
184 Cf. infra, Chapter 4. 
185 Cf retro, p. 19. 
186 Fadeyeva v Russia, Application No. 55723/00, decided on 9 June 2005 
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Mrs. Fadeyeva lived in a flat that had been assigned to her husband under a special 
scheme of life-long tenancy. After the Soviet period, the housing had passed to the 
control of the local municipality, functioning de facto as council homes. Tenants of 
the dwellings paid a rent substantially lower than market rate and had full right to use 
and control of the property. According to domestic legislation, tenants whose living 
conditions did not correspond to the required standards were eligible to be placed on a 
waiting list for new council housing. 192 
In 1995 Mrs. Fadeyeva and other residents of her apartment block had brought a court 
action seeking resettlement outside the sanitary security zone. They claimed that the 
conditions of the neighbourhood where they lived were unfavorable for humans and 
potentially dangerous to health and life. They maintained that local planning 
regulations imposed an obligation on the plant's owner to resettle them to an 
ecologically safe area. 193 
The domestic courts acknowledged that Mrs. Fadeyeva's home was situated within 
the sanitary security zone and that she had a right to be resettled. However, they did 
not order her resettlement, but simply instructed the local authorities to place her on a 
waiting list to obtain new local authority housing. 194 In this regard, council authorities 
had no obligation to provide a timetable for resettlement and it was submitted that the 
first person on the waiting list for Mrs. Fadeyeva's area had been there since 1968. 195 
The applicant later sought execution of the judgment, relying on her rights to respect 
for her private life and home, as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human 
Rights, to which Russia became a party in 1998. The applicant further relied on the 
Russian Constitution, which expressly provides for a right to a favorable environment 
and the right to compensation for damage to health or property by ecological 
offences. 196 Her application was, however, dismissed as the domestic courts were 
satisfied that the judgment had been executed since the applicant had been placed on a 
waiting list. 197 To the date of proceedings in Strasbourg, the question of the 
resettlement of the inhabitants of the dwellings where the applicant lived remained 
unsettled. 
The applicant turned to Strasbourg, asserting that the operation of a steel plant in 
close proximity to her home endangered her health and well-being, as protected by 
Article 8. 198 In her initial submissions Mrs. Fadeyeva had also sought to rely on 
Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the Convention. These claims, however, had been rejected as 
manifestly ill-founded, as the applicant did not face any 'real and immediate risk' 
either to her physical integrity or her life and the alleged detriment she suffered could 
not be said to raise any issues under Articles 2 and 3. Furthermore, the Court also 
refused to consider the case under Article 6, as it found that the applicant had been 
afforded ample opportunity to State her case before national courts. The Court took an 
192 Housing Code of the RSFSR of24 June 1983, cf. Fadeyeva v Russia, at 61. 
193 Fadeyeva v Russia, at 20. 
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analogous view in the cases of another 4 Cherepovets residents who lodged 
applications on grounds similar to those of Mrs. Fadeyeva. 199 
With specific reference to the claim under Article 8, the applicant argued that the 
Russian authorities had failed to protect her private life and home from the severe 
environmental nuisance caused by the steel plant, with detriment to her health and 
well-being. 200 Mrs. Fadeyeva maintained that the concentration of certain toxic 
substances near her home constantly exceeded the safety levels established by 
Russian law, pointing out that State authorities had not produced the data collected at 
the screening post 300 metres from her home, as she had specifically requested. She 
consequently proposed that the Court drew adverse inferences from the Government's 
failure to produce this evidence. 201 
The applicant also submitted that the plant's em1sswns included highly noxious 
substances202 that, according to an expert report prepared for the applicant, exposed 
local residents to a range of serious diseases. 203 
As to the impact on her personal health, Mrs. Fadeyeva submitted a medical report 
stating that she suffered for various illnesses, such as neuropathy of the upper 
extremities and osteochondrosis, in recognition of which she had received early 
retirement and compensatory benefits. The report did not attribute any specific cause 
to the illnesses, but said that working in conditions of toxic pollution would 
exacerbate them. The applicant stressed that, if this were true with regard to her 
working conditions, which entailed exposure to toxic emissions only during working 
times, this was afortiori applicable to permanent residence conditions.204 
Mrs. Fadeyeva referred to recent domestic case law establishing the local council's 
immediate obligation to resettle a citizen living in the sanitary security zone of a 
railway. 205 She also recalled that, in the case of another Cherepovets resident, a 
domestic court had expressed doubts as to whether the applicant's placement on that 
waiting list could be regarded as giving a real chance to live in an environment 
favorable to life and health. 206 
In their initial observations, the Government accepted that the applicant lived in the 
sanitary security zone, but argued that her placement on a waiting list was necessary 
to protect the rights of other subjects in the same situation. In their post-admissibility 
observations, however, the Government disputed the very fact that the applicant's 
home was situated within the plant's sanitary security zone. 207 They further 
maintained that, in any case, Russian legislation allowed people to reside temporarily 
in environmentally unfavorable territories. The Government also pointed out that 
199 Cf. Ledyayeva v Russia, Application No. 53157/99, currently pending; Dobrokhoytova v Russia, Application 
No. 53247/99, currently pending; Zolorateva v Russia, Application No. 53695/00, currently pending; Romashina v 
Russia, Application No. 56850/00, currently pending. 
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domestic authorities constantly monitored the plant's em1ss1ons and had imposed 
administrative sanctions on several occasions.208 Lastly, the Government submitted 
that the applicant had come to nuisance by moving into an area where the plant had 
already been in operation for many years. 209 
Contrary to the Court's requests, the Government did not produce the information on 
the emission levels recorded at the monitoring station next to the applicant's block. 
They instead produced a 2004 Report, based on long-term average of pollutant levels. 
This data showed that the local environmental situation had improved in recent years, 
although admittedly five priority pollutants still exceeded safety standards and more 
than 150.000 people lived in a zone where the level of acceptable risk was 
exceeded.210 However, the Government stressed that pollution in the applicant's area 
was not significantly different from that in other areas of the city. 
Overall, the Government accepted that pollutants in the applicant's area exceeded the 
limits set by domestic law. Nevertheless, they submitted that there was no evidence 
that the applicant's private life had in any way been disrupted by this, as the damage 
she suffered was merely potential. 211 The Government denied that the applicant had 
established a link between her health problems and her place of residence, as the 
diseases she was suffering from had merely occupational nature. 212 The Government 
further submitted that this specific issue had never been considered by a domestic 
court and therefore the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available 
to her.213 
The Court preliminarily observed that both parties had accepted that the applicant's 
place of residence was affected by industrial pollution and that this was caused by the 
steel plant. The dispute therefore pertained to whether the nuisance suffered by the 
applicant amounted to interference relevant to her rights under Article 8.214 
The Court recalled that the Convention did not include a right to nature preservation 
and that, in order to raise an issue under Article 8, there had to be some interference, 
which directly affected the applicant's home, family or private life. 215 Accordingly, the 
Court asserted that, in order to fall under this provision, claims relating to 
environmental nuisance had to show actual interference with the applicant's private 
sphere and that a certain minimum level of severity was attained. 216 The Court 
specified that the relevant criteria in this respect included the intensity and duration of 
the nuisance, its physical or mental effect and the general environmental context. 217 
The Court also clarified that there could be no arguable claim if the detriment 
complained of was negligible in comparison to environmental hazards inherent to life 
in every modern city. 218 
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On the facts of the case, the Court acknowledged that Mrs. Fadeyeva had failed to 
prove a casual link between the pollution produced by the plant and her health 
conditions. 219 Nevertheless, it observed that the plant had systematically breached the 
safety standards prescribed by domestic law, leading to an increase in local morbidity 
rate. Over the years the breach of domestic standards had remained unaltered and the 
Court agreed with the applicant that the Government's failure to produce the 
information requested could hide more severe short term violations of safety 
regulations. As the area where Mrs. Fadeyeva lived was classified as unfit for 
habitation and her right to be resettled had been acknowledged by national courts, 220 
the Court found it established that the interference with the applicant's private sphere 
had been taken for granted at the domestic level. 221 
On these grounds, the Court found that, although the applicant had been unable to 
prove a specific harm to her health, 'the very strong combination of indirect evidence 
and presumptions' made it possible to conclude that her health had deteriorated as a 
result of the prolonged exposure to industrial emissions. The Court further asserted 
that, even assuming that the pollution had not caused any quantifiable harm to the 
applicant's health, it had inevitably made her more vulnerable to various diseases, 
affecting the quality of life at her home. 222 The Court accordingly accepted that the 
actual detriment to Mrs. Fadeyeva's health and well-being had reached a level 
sufficient to constitute interference within the notion of Article 8 of the Convention. 223 
The Court went on to consider whether this interference could be attributed to the 
Russian authorities. The Court noted that, although the plant was privately owned, 
this did not relieve domestic authorities of their responsibilities, as 'failure to regulate 
private industry' might entail a violation of their positive obligations.224 The Court 
observed that domestic authorities had de facto controlled the plant through the 
imposition of operational conditions and supervision of their implementation.225 
Equally, the competent authorities were aware of the situation of persistent illegality 
affecting the plant, which had lasted for several decades. Consequently, in the Court's 
opinion there was 'a sufficient nexus' between the emissions and State authorities, 
which had been in a position to evaluate the hazards related to the plant's operation 
and to reduce them.226 
The Court went on to establish whether the domestic authorities' conduct could be 
regarded as justified according to the principles listed in the second paragraph of 
Article 8. The Court recalled that direct interferences with this provision were 
acceptable only when they took place in accordance with the law.227 The Court went 
on to explain that, in relation to positive obligations, this criterion merely represented 
one of many aspects that should be taken into account when assessing whether the 
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State had struck a fair balance between the competing interests and not as a separate 
and conclusive test. 228 
The Court accepted that the economic well-being of the country constituted a 
legitimate aim according to the second paragraph of Article 8229 and went on to 
consider whether domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the interests 
at stake on the facts of the case. 
The Court preliminarily asserted that, as well-established in its jurisprudence, 
environmental pollution had become a matter of growing public concern in today' s 
society. 230 Although it was not appropriate to adopt a special approach by reference to 
a special status of environmental human rights/31 still the Court found that it lay 
within its competence to evaluate whether there had been a manifest error of 
appreciation on the part of the national authorities. 232 In this connection, the Court 
Stated that it had a merely subsidiary role with reference to the complexity of issues 
involved with environmental protection,233 and that only in exceptional circumstances 
could it go beyond the mere assessment on the fairness of the decision, revising the 
domestic authorities' conclusions. 234 
The Court noticed that the plant operated in persistent conditions of non-compliance 
with domestic legislation235 and the introduction of a sanitary security zone was meant 
to limit its impact on the local population's health. In the Court's opinion, the 
existence of this zone was a condicio sine qua non for the operation of a dangerous 
enterprise, which, otherwise, should have been closed or significantly restructured. 236 
On the facts of the case, the Court noted that the sanitary security zone had not served 
its purpose, as pollution levels in the city had continued to exceed safety levels. ·237 
The Court established that Mrs. Fadeyeva undisputedly lived within the sanitary 
security zone. 238 The fact that her place of residence was not significantly more 
polluted than other areas of the city did not change the circumstance that she lived in a 
special area where industrial pollution exceeded safety levels and any housing was in 
principle prohibited by domestic legislation. 239 The Court did not find that fact that the 
applicant had come to the source of nuisance proprio motu made any substantial 
difference to her claim. In its opinion, Mrs. Fadeyeva had not contributed to the 
creation of the risk to which she was subject, as she had not been in a position to 
evaluate the health hazards of her accommodation, whereas State authorities were 
well aware of them. 24° Furthermore, although in theory there were no obstacles to Mrs 
Fadeyeva's moving away from the endangered zone, in practice she had no economic 
means to do so.241 
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As Russian law did not clarify the action to be taken with regard to persons who 
already lived in sanitary security zones, the Court did not consider that the domestic 
courts' decisions had been unreasonable. 242 However, the measures they applied had 
made no difference to Mrs. Fadeyeva, who had little hope to be resettled in the near 
future. 243 The Court nevertheless noted that 'the State had at its disposal a number of 
other tools capable of preventing or minimising pollution'.244 
In this respect, the Court established that, even if the pollution in Cherepovets had 
decreased in the last 20 years, still the standards set by domestic legislation had 
continued to be systematically breached. 245 The Court observed that, although it was 
not its task of determining the measures that should have been taken in order to 
reduce pollution more efficiently/46 it was certainly within its jurisdiction to assess 
whether the Government had approached the problem with due diligence. In 
particular, the Court asserted that it was incumbent upon the State to justify a situation 
in which certain individuals bore a heavy burden on behalf of the rest of the 
community. 247 
The Court pointed out that the Government had not produced any copies of the plant's 
operating permit, nor it had specified how the local population's interests had been 
taken into consideration.248 Similarly, the Court highlighted that it had not received 
any proof of the checks and penalties allegedly inflicted upon the plant. 249 As the poor 
information submitted by the Government made it difficult to appraise their overall 
policies, the Court found by adverse inference that they had not attached due weight 
to the interests of the community living near the plant. 250 
The Court further emphasised that domestic authorities had not offered any effective 
solution to the applicant's petition for resettlement. This had happened in the context 
of a situation of widespread breach of domestic environmental standards, which the 
authorities had not attempted to remedy. In the light of the above, the Court concluded 
that the Russian authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between the interest of 
the community and Mrs. Fadeyeva's effective enjoyment of her right to respect for 
her home and private life. 
The applicant was granted 6,000 EUR for the non-pecuniary damage associated with 
the distress caused by her prolonged exposure to industrial pollution. The Court did 
not grant any pecuniary damage, as the applicant had not incurred any expenses or 
material loss related to the breach of her rights. Furthermore, the Court made express 
reference to the fact that the Government had to take appropriate measures to remedy 
the applicant's individual situation.251 The Russian Government asked that the case be 
referred to a Grand Chamber, but the request was rejected. 
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The reasoning employed by the Court raises a number of crucial points. First of all, 
the decision marks a further opening in the interpretation of the victim requirement 
under the Convention. Although the applicant had not proved any specific health 
condition or property damage, the fact that she lived in an area affected by unlawful 
pollution induced the Court to conclude that there had been an interference with her 
rights. 252 With close analogy to the case of Taskin and others v Turkey, Mrs. 
Fadeyeva's exposure to a risk was considered sufficient to constitute an actual 
violation of her rights. 253 More than in Taskin, though, not only the applicant had not 
been able to prove any damage to her health, but she did not have any title to property 
and had moved to an area severely affected by pollution on her own initiative.254 
Furthermore, her conditions were the same as those of the other 150, 000 local 
residents. 
The circumstances could not be more different from those of the case of Tauria ( cf. 
above), where the applicants' health had been severely affected by radioactivity. In 
the Fadeyeva case, however, rather than imposing on the applicant the to demonstrate 
that she had suffered for health conditions, the Court established that the breach of 
domestic regulations was enough to establish interference with her rights. In this 
respect, the Court was ready to find that, given the violation of national law 
engineered to protect local residents from the health hazards posed by the operation of 
the iron smelter, there had been ipso iure an undue interference with the applicant's 
rights. This represents a clear departure from the previous jurisprudence of the Court, 
which required reasonable and convincing evidence of the probability of the 
occurrence of a violation concerning the applicants personally, as mere suspicions or 
conjectures were not enough.255 In Fadeyeva, instead, the Court placed upon the State 
the burden to produce detailed and rigorous data justifying the policies adopted with 
regard to environmental pollution.256 As the poor information submitted by the 
defending State made it difficult to evaluate its overall policies, the Court found by 
adverse inference that it had not attached due weight to the interests of the local 
community.257 This finding is quite remarkable. The Court has instituted the practice 
of finding by adverse inference in cases of lack of cooperation by domestic 
authorities/58 but it has never done so in connection with an environmental claim. 
Thus in the Fadeyeva decision the Court seems to have offered a pragmatic answer to 
the question of evidence, one of the most problematic aspects of environmental cases. 
The applicant did not need to prove damage to her health and her victim status was 
grounded on indirect evidence and presumptions, seemingly resulting from the very 
breach of domestic standards. 259 This finding seems all the more remarkable when one 
considers that there are 150, 000 persons enduring the same identical conditions of 
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Mrs. Fadeyeva. Four of them have already applied to the Court, their cases have been 
declared admissible and are currently awaiting for decision.260 Thousands of others 
may follow, in case of positive outcome. 
In the Fadeyeva case, not only the Court awarded compensation, but also it also 
specifically asked domestic authorities to take appropriate measures to remedy the 
applicant's situation.261 In this respect, the Court found that, although the domestic 
courts had acted properly, even when enforced, their pronouncements were unsuitable 
to offer redress to the applicant. The Court further observed that due to the lack of 
effective remedy for the violation of domestic standards, Mrs Fadeyeva would have 
continued being a victim for the foreseeable future. In this State of affairs, the Court 
concluded that domestic authorities had to take action otherwise in order to solve the 
situation. Although the Court had previously taken the initiative of requesting specific 
action with regard to Article 8 claims/62 This represented a novelty for an 
environmental case and previous attempts to challenge the national legislation's 
adequacy to the protection of rights under Article 8 had met the Court's self-
restraint. 263 This further leaves room to speculate that in future the Court may institute 
the practice of demanding specific remedial action in cases of severe environmental 
degradation. 
In the instant case the Court was also particularly generous in enunciating the criteria 
that it employs in establishing whether environmental pollution raises any issue under 
Article 8. The elements quoted in this respect were the intensity and duration of the 
nuisance, its physical and mental effects and the general environmental context. 264 The 
Court also took the occasion to elaborate on the weight to be attached to the 
lawfulness of the public authorities' actions, surpassing the principle expressed in the 
Hatton decision by establishing that this question had to be considered 'as one factor 
to be weighed among others and not as a separate and conclusive test. ' 265 The Court 
further emphasised that the Convention might only be engaged by cases of 
environmental deterioration which are not 'negligible in comparison to the 
environmental hazards inherent to life in every modern city. ' 266 
The Fadeyeva judgment represented a landmark evolution in the Court's 
jurisprudence. 267 The line established in this decision found remarkable confirmation 
in 2006, with the decision in 69kan and others v Turkey. 268 The applicants were 315 
residents of the village of Ovacik, as were the applicants in Taskin and others v 
Turkey. The application was based on analogous grounds and had been filed on the 
same day, by the same legal advisor. The applicants complained that the operation of 
a goldmine had breached their rights under Article 8 and that the public authorities' 
inertia had breached their rights under Article 6. 
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The Court acknowledged that the subject-matter of the application had already been 
considered in the Taskin case. The claim was granted both on Article 8 and 6 grounds 
and the brief decision reproduces verbatim whole paragraphs of the Taskin judgment. 
Accordingly, the mere threat of damage to the applicants' health and property was 
sufficient to constitute a violation of their rights. As in Taskin, the applicants received 
3,000 EUR each in compensation, but the reasoning of the Court in the two instances 
presented some marked differences. In the Taskin decision, the Court had Stated that 
the violation of the Convention had 'undoubtedly caused the applicants a 
considerable degree of damage', as they were 'obliged to tolerate adverse living 
conditions and to bring several actions against decisions taken by the central 
authorities'. 269 In the 09kan case, by contrast, the Court observed that it did not see a 
causal link between the noted violations and an unspecified material damage or a 
physical injury.270 Therefore, it did not provide any compensation for pecuniary 
damage, but allocated with each applicant 3,000 EUR in equity for moral damage. 271 
Therefore, meanwhile in Taskin the Court had made reference to a generic 
considerable degree of damage, without further specification, in 09kan the Court 
explicitly Stated that there had been no physical or material injury, but still 
compensated the applicants for the moral pledge associated with the distress they 
suffered. Consequently, the Court expressly acknowledged what seemed to be implicit 
in its recent case law, i.e. that the distress associated with the lack of enforcement of 
domestic regulations in environmental matters may pave the way to compensation in 
Strasbourg. 
The judgment reinforced the broad interpretation of the notion of victim adopted in 
the Court's recent case law. The 09kan case was the first to deal with a replica 
environmental claim and may be regarded as the first sample of mass applications 
hypothesised with reference to the Fadeyeva judgment. The impact of this case law on 
the enforcement of domestic regulations may be quite significant and domestic 
authorities may start feeling an increased incentive in adopting a preventive approach. 
The 09kan decision is going to cost the Turkish government 945,000 EUR and the 
authorities managed to persuade a number of applicants to settle the claim out of 
court. This last resort approach may soon be followed by better enforcement of 
domestic regulations, in line with the spirit of the Convention. 
Some conclusions 
The review of the Court's environmental cases under Article 8 permits to draw some 
general conclusions on the way in which this provision has been interpreted for the 
pursuit of environmental interests. The Court has increasingly found that respect for 
private and family life includes the protection against a number of environmentally 
sensitive intrusions. 
In its initial decisions, the Court acknowledged that positive obligations incumbent 
upon national authorities required appropriate environmental standards in domestic 
law and their effective implementation (cf. L6pez-Ostra v Spain). In the majority of 
269 Taskin and others v Turkey, at 140. 
270 O~kan and others v Turkey, at 61. 
271 Ibidem, at 62. 
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cases, environmental domestic standards were not implemented and their adequacy 
was not scrutinised on the merits. 
The decisions in the cases of Taskin and Fadeyeva brought further evolutions. The 
Court identified with greater precision the factors relevant to the application of Article 
8272 and has proved more willing to require State s to justify their environmental 
policies. 273 Moreover, in the Fadeyeva decision the Court has taken the initiative of 
finding by adverse inference and has fallen short of asking for positive action to 
remedy the applicant's situation. 
The most salient feature of the recent case law, however, is the consistent broadening 
of the victim requirement. In environmental cases the crucial question is to establish 
when an individual may claim to be a victim under the Convention. The case law 
under Article 8 shows that the Court has accepted that the applicants' vulnerability to 
future harm is enough to bring them within the relevant notion of victim. In this 
regard, the breach of domestic standards has been considered sufficient to constitute a 
violation of the applicants' rights, without requiring any material prejudice to their 
personal sphere. The mere threat of damage has therefore become relevant also in 
environmental cases, clearly breaking new ground in the jurisprudence of the Court. 
In this respect, the Court seems to have established a twofold approach. In cases 
where the applicants were unable to obtain any recognition of their rights at the 
domestic level, the Court seems to demand that they prove that a certain prejudice 
affected their personal sphere - e.g. L6pez-Ostra v Spain and, more recently, Moreno 
Gomez v Spain. Where applicants obtained acknowledgement of their rights by 
domestic courts, the Court adopted a more liberal approach to the victim requirement 
and was satisfied by far lighter forms of interference with the applicants' rights- cf. 
the cases of Taskin, Fadeyeva and OfYkan. Hence a very interesting opening, allowing 
applicants to challenge the lack of enforcement of domestic regulations in Strasbourg. 
Nevertheless, at present only egregious failures are likely to give rise to responsibility, 
on a marginal view of the role of the Court. This factor may be further appreciated 
with regard to the case law of the Court in other environmental cases, relying upon 
other provisions of the Convention. 
272 According to a listing compiled by Philip Leach, possible factors include: the extent direct effect on a person's 
right to respect for their private and family life and/or their home; the extent of the actual interference with the 
applicant's·private sphere; the effects on a person's weJlcbeing, such as the adverse effect on the quality of a 
person's private life, on the scope of enjoying the amenities of a person's home; whether a minimum threshold as 
to the adverse effects has been reached, depending on the intensity, duration and physical and mental effects; the 
probability of the occurrence of the damage; an increase in vulnerability to disease. Cf. P. LEACH, Stay inside 
when the wind blows your way, cit., p. 91. 
273 Fadeyeva v Russia, at I 05; Taskin and others v Turkey, at 117. 
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3. The new frontier of Article 2 
According to Article 2 of the Convention, 
I. Everyone's right to life will be protected by law. No one will be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation oflife will not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence 
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
c. in action lawfully taken for purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
The right to life is the most fundamental of human rights and represents 'one of the 
most basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. ' 274 
The right primarily refers to the prohibition of the arbitrary or negligent taking of 
human life by or on the behalf of the State. The norm does not allow any derogation 
in time of war or public emergency275 and the only exceptions concern capital 
punishment and deaths resulting from the use of force for purposes permitted by the 
second paragraph of Article 2. 276 
The 'serious and irreparable nature' of violations of this right has suggested a broad 
interpretation of its protection.277 According to the Court's consolidated case law, 
Article 2 'does not solely concern deaths resulting directly from the actions of agents 
of the State, but also lays down a positive obligation on States to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. ' 278 In general, the extent 
of the obligations depends on factors such as the harmfulness of dangerous activities 
and the foreseeability of risks to life. 279 
Public authorities' obligations in relation to the right to life are not just preventive: the 
Court has also developed a procedural aspect of Article 2, including guarantees 
relating to the due investigation of cases of loss of life and the prosecution of those 
responsible for it. 280 
274 Cf. McCann v UK, Application No. 18984/91, at 147. 
275 Cf. Article 15 of the Convention. 
276 With regard to capital punishment, however, the Sixth Protocol to the Convention abolished the death penalty 
in peacetime for all its parties. Cf. Sixth Protocol to the Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty, Strasbourg, 28 April 
1983, CETS No. 114, entered into force in 1988. To the date, the Protocol has been ratified by all the Member 
states, except for Russia. 
277 Cf. Soering v UK, Application No. 14038/88, at 90. 
278 LCB v UK, Application No. 23413/94, at 36; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK, Application No. 46477/99, at 
54; Onerytldtz v. Turkey, Application No. 48939/99, GC, at 71. 
279 Onerytldtz v. Turkey, GC, cit., at. 73; LCB. v. UK, cit., at 37-41. 
28° Cf. McCann v UK, cit., at 161: 'The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision (art. 2), read in 
conjunction with the State's general duty under Article I of the Convention to 'secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention', requires by implication that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter 
alios, agents of the State.' 
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The quality of the environment is susceptible of having substantial influence upon the 
full enjoyment of the right to life and it is not difficult to conceive that the positive 
obligations related to this provision may apply to some cases of environmental 
degradation produced directly by State activities, or through the exercise of dangerous 
activities by third parties. 281 Although other international human rights bodies have 
taken significant steps in this direction/82 the European Court of Human Rights has 
long been reluctant to do so. 
In LCB v UK/83 for example, the applicant claimed that the State's failure to warn her 
parents of the possible risks to her health caused by her father's participation in the 
nuclear tests, had given rise to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. 284 The Court 
acknowledged that if, on the basis of the information available to the State at the time 
in question, it had appeared likely that exposure of the applicant's father to radiation 
might have caused a real risk to her health, then the United Kingdom would have been 
required to act on its own motion to advise her parents and monitor her health. 285 The 
Court, however was not satisfied that the applicant had proved a causal link between 
the exposure of her father to radiation and her illness. 286 The Court therefore 
concluded that, given the information available to the State at the relevant time, it 
could not have been expected to act of its own motion to notify the applicant's parents 
of the risks or to take any other special action in relation to her. Accordingly, no 
violation of Article 2 had taken place. 
This decision placed a heavy burden of proof upon the applicant, requiring her to 
prove a direct and unequivocal link between her health conditions and the irradiation 
to which her father had been subjected. This attitude was in line with the Court's 
established approach to environmental cases at that time, as confirmed by decisions 
such as Tauria and others v France. 287 In 2002, however, this trend saw a substantial 
development with the case of Oneryildiz v. Turkey. 
Oneryildiz v. Turkey288 
Oneryzldzz v. Turkey was the first case in which the Court declared a violation of 
Article 2 in connection with lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. The 
applicant complained that the Turkish authorities had violated the right to life and 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions in failing to prevent a gas explosion at a waste 
storage site, which had caused the death of 9 members of his family and the 
destruction of his home. He further maintained that he had not been granted a fair and 
prompt remedy, contrary to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. 
281 R.S. PATHAK, The Human Rights System as a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in: 
Environmental Change and International Law, WEISS ed., Tokyo, 1992, p. 205. 
282 For the UNHRC, cf. the case of Port Hope Environmental Group v Canada, No. 67/1980, Selected Decisions of 
the UN Human Rights Committee, 1990, p. 20; for the Inter-American Commission, cf. the case of Yanomani 
Indians v Brazil, Decision 7615, IACHR, Inter-American YB on Human Rights (1985), p. 264; Community of San 
Mateo de Huanchor and its Members v Peril, Case 504/03, Report No. 69/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.LN/11.122 Doc. 5 rev. I at 487 (2004). 
283 LCB v UK, Application No. 23413/94. 
284 LCB v UK, at 24. 
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The waste storage site had operated under the authority of the city council and the 
ministerial authorities, to the service of a number of districts of the city of Istanbul. 
Originally the site was 3.5 kilometres from the nearest built-up area, but over the 
years a number of illegal dwellings had developed in its proximity, including that 
where the applicant's family had been living since1988. 
In 1991 an expert report warned the authorities that the waste storage site posed 
several risks to the lives of local residents, with multiple breaches of safety standards 
prescribed by national law. The report instigated a lengthy dispute between national 
authorities, but no action was taken in order to prevent the risks denounced. As the 
dispute continued, in 1993 a methane explosion caused a landslide that engulfed slum 
dwellings, causing the death of 39 people, including the applicant's wife, his 
concubine and 7 of his children. 
Investigations started immediately and, according to an expert report, 2/3 liability for 
the accident was attributed to public authorities. The Turkish Administrative Council 
brought criminal proceedings against two local mayors for negligence in the 
performance of their duties. No proceedings were ever brought against any other 
public authority involved, nor charges of manslaughter made. In 1996 the mayors 
were sentenced to the minimal term of imprisonment and to fines of 160.000 TRL. 
However, the sentence was suspended, as the court was satisfied that the defendants 
would not offend again. 
A few weeks after the incident, Mr. Oneryildiz lodged a complaint against the 
authorities whose negligence had caused the engulfing of his home and the death of 
his relatives. The complaint was added to the public prosecutor's file. The applicant, 
however, maintained that he had never been informed of the criminal proceedings 
against the two mayors. 
In September 1993 Mr. Oneryildiz also sought compensation from the administrative 
authorities for the harm he had suffered as a result of the accident. The domestic court 
acknowledged the causal link between the accident and the contributory negligence of 
the authorities in question, granting to the applicant 100.000.000 TRL for non-
pecuniary damage and 10.000.000 for pecuniary damage (equivalent to 2.077 EUR 
and 208 EUR, respectively). The limited amount of compensation was justified on 
grounds that the applicant had not had a legitimate title to the property and that after 
the accident he had received subsidised accommodation from the council. The 
sentence was served in 1998, but to the date of proceedings in Strasbourg the sum had 
not yet been paid. 
The applicant made recourse to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the 
death of his family members and flaws in the relevant proceedings had constituted a 
violation of his rights. The Turkish Government opposed the claim, submitting that 
the concept of a positive obligation under Article 2 could not be construed as 
imposing a duty to protect life in circumstances giving rise to 'allegations of 
negligence'. 289 They further argued that the operation of an installation for the storage 
of waste involved only a very slight risk ai1d should not be regarded as the exercise of 
289 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, at 59. 
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a potentially dangerous activity comparable with those pertaining to nuclear or 
industrial installations. 290 
By reference to its established case law,291 the Court recalled that, although not every 
presumed threat to life obliges the authorities to take concrete measures to avoid that 
risk, 'the position is different if it is established that the authorities knew, or ought to 
have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
individual ( ... ) and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers 
which might have been expected to avoid that risk'. 292 
The Court further emphasised that recent development of European standards 
confirmed 'an increased awareness of the duties incumbent on the national public 
authorities in the environmental field, particularly with regard to installations for the 
storage of household waste and the risks inherent in operating them' .293 
In the Court's view, the positive obligations to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within their jurisdiction for purposes of Article 2 were applicable to the 
case in question and it proceeded to assess compliance under two heads: 
implementation of preventive regulations and respect for the public's right to 
information. 
As to the first, the Government submitted that the Turkish authorities had always gone 
to great lengths to protect the life of slums' inhabitants, attempting to fight against 
their expansion. Furthermore, the Government pointed out that local residents had 
resisted the waste-collection site redevelopment. 294 
The applicant, on the other hand, maintained that one third of the Turkish population 
lived in slums, which were encouraged by the frequent amnesty laws passed to 
regularise them. As to his personal situation, the applicant argued that local authorities 
were well aware of the existence of the slum where he lived and even provided it with 
essential installations and services, charging council taxes.295 
The Court observed that the issue of waste storage was the object of extensive 
legislation at national level, which was admittedly breached in the case of the site in 
question. 296 In this regard, the Court asserted that 'it was impossible for the 
administrative and municipal departments ( ... ) not to have known of the risks 
inherent in methanogenesis or of the necessary preventive measures, particularly as 
there were specific regulations in the area which, moreover, were not in any way 
complied with. ' 297 
The cessation of the redevelopment of the site could not be imputed to residents, but 
to local authorities, which had remained inactive in the face of the risks posed by the 
waste storage site. Furthermore, even if national authorities had never encouraged the 
290 Ibidem. 
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applicant to set up home in the vicinity of a waste tip, they had not attempted to 
discourage him from doing so.298 Consequently, the Court found that there had been a 
causal link between the national authorities' negligence and the accident causing the 
death of the applicant's relatives. 
The Court then proceeded to assess whether the authorities had fulfilled their duty to 
inform the public of the dangers to which they were exposed. The Court noted that the 
present case featured marked similarities to the circumstances of the case of Guerra 
and others v Italy,299 asserting that the authorities' duty to impart iriformation about 
the dangers of which only they had knowledge under Article 8 extended a fortiori to 
the positive obligations under Article 2.300 The Court considered that ordinary citizens 
such as the applicant could not be expected to know of the specific risks inherent in 
the process of methanogenesis and of a possible landslide at the site. The Court 
further noticed that, even if the applicant had been personally aware of the risks 
affecting his family, this would not have absolved the authorities from the 
responsibility of having permitted the situation thereo£.3°1 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that domestic authorities had breached their duty to do everything that 
could reasonably be expected of them to protect the applicant's family, unless the 
applicant's complaints had been properly dealt with at domestic leveP02 
The Court emphasised that, in addition to the payment of compensation, the 
procedural guarantees under Article 2 required 'a thorough and effective investigation 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the 
death' and the 'putting in place of effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery 
for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions' .303 
The Court also recalled that, if infringement of the right to life were not caused 
intentionally, Article 2 did not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law 
remedy. 304 
With regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the Court noted that, although 
administrative and criminal proceedings had been brought against the local 
authorities, they were affected by a series of substantial flaws. First of all, the 
applicant had not been given the opportunity to access criminal proceedings. The 
Court further noted that the domestic courts had failed to consider the life-
endangering aspects related to the negligent conduct of the local authorities, giving 
derisory sanctions amounting to virtual impunity for the defendants. 305 
As to the administrative proceedings, the Court noted that the remedy awarded to the 
applicant was too little and too late. The sentence was served over 4 years after the 
applicant's complaint and, furthermore, the symbolic compensation he had been 
298 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, at 81. 
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awarded had never been paid.306 Accordingly, the Court concluded that there had been 
a violation of Article 2.307 
The Court did not find it necessary to consider the applicant's claims under Article 6, 
8 and 13, as they had been absorbed by the finding of a breach of Article 2. Instead 
the Court found that the case deserved further analysis on grounds of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 
The applicant had submitted that Turkish law recognised the right of acquisition of 
property by adverse possession and maintained that he had used his house 
continuously for a sufficiently long time to be regarded as its owner. He further 
maintained that the explosion at the waste storage site had impaired his property right 
which had not been redressed by the accommodation he later purchased from the 
council at a favorable rate. As to the compensation he had received through the 
administrative proceedings, the applicant criticised the contemptuous reasoning of the 
domestic courts, which found that the family was not supposed to own household 
electrical appliances and therefore refused to compensate him for it. In any case, the 
applicant pointed out that compensation had still not been paid and the amount 
liquidated had become insignificant, due to high monetary depreciation observed in 
Turkey.308 
The Government disputed the applicant's claims, asserting that the unlawfulness of 
his dwellings prevented him from bringing any claims under Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1 to the Convention. 309 
The Court recalled the autonomy of the concept of possession under the Convention, 
emphasising that 'neither the lack of recognition by the domestic laws of a private 
interest such as a 'right' nor the fact that these laws do not regard such interest as a 
'right of property', prevented the interest in question from being regarded as a 
'possession' within the meaning of Article I of Protocol No. I. ' 310 The Court 
proceeded to assess whether the applicant could be considered to be entitled to a 
substantial proprietary interest relevant to the purposes of the norm. 
The Court acknowledged that the applicant had never attempted to obtain the 
regularisation of his dwellings, which were undoubtedly unlawful. The Court, 
however, found that 'the applicant was nonetheless to all intents and purposes the 
owner of the structure and fixtures and fittings of the dwelling he had built and of all 
the household and personal effects which might have been in it. ' 311 The Court noticed 
that since 1988 Mr. Oneryildiz had been living in that dwelling without being 
bothered by the authorities, without paying any rent and establishing a social and 
family environment, as 'there had been nothing to stop him from expecting the 
situation to remain the same for himself and his family. ' 312 
306 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, at 118. 
307 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, at 122. 
308 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, at 133. 
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The Court asserted that the fact that the applicant had been able to enjoy the illegal 
dwellings undisturbed amounted to an implicit tolerance by the authorities of his 
position. Accordingly, it concluded that these dwelling represented a substantial 
economic interest, which the authorities allowed to subsist over a long period of time, 
amounting to a 'possession' within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention. 313 
The Court went on to consider whether there had been interference with the 
possessions of the applicant. On the facts of the case, the 'accumulation of omissions 
by the administrative authorities regarding the measures necessary to avoid the risk 
of a methane-gas explosion and an ensuing landslide' run counter to the requirement 
of practical and effective protection of the right guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1.314 Therefore, the interference with the right could not be justified under 
domestic law. The subsequent administrative proceedings had failed to remedy the 
situation, as the applicant's loss was overlooked by the judicial authorities, whose 
activity had been disproportionately time-consuming and ineffective. Consequently, 
the Court found that there had been a breach also of Article l of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention. 315 The Court awarded compensation to the applicant and his three 
surviving children, in the amount of EUR 154,000 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damage. 
The decision broke new grounds at several levels. This was the first case in which the 
Court found a violation of Article 2 in relation to a breach of environmental 
regulations. Additionally, the Court found that there had been a breach of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, drastically reviewing its approach to illegitimate 
dwellings.316 The Chamber decision, in particular, seemed to suggest that the domestic 
authorities' tolerance of a situation of widespread illegitimacy could be regarded as 
sufficient to establish possession within the meaning of the Convention. 
Three dissenting judges appended an opinion questioning whether Article 1 was 
applicable to the facts of the case; meanwhile another two judges contested the 
application of Article 2. The Turkish Government requested that the case be referred 
to a Grand Chamber, maintaining that the decision had given place to an 
'unprecedented extension of the positive obligations inherent in [Article 2],' by 
including in it 'all situations of unintentional death. ' 317 The Government warned that 
such interpretation of the State's responsibility for facts that were not directly 
attributable to its agents would broaden excessively the incidence of potential 
violations of Article 2. 318 The Government further submitted that States were under no 
obligation to take preventive measures where there was no question of an immediate 
danger within the meaning of the Court's case law. 319 In particular, the Government 
submitted that the Chamber had overlooked the precautions and measures put in place 
by domestic authorities, exercising an excessively close scrutiny of their activities, 
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contrary to its consolidated jurisprudence under Article 2.320 The Government further 
recalled that the victims themselves bore some responsibility for the accident and 
maintained that the applicant had had access to a satisfactory remedy. 
The applicant, on the other hand, confirmed the submissions made before the 
Chamber, recalling that episodes of negligence on part of the State authorities clearly 
fell within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention. The applicant reiterated that 
the Government had encouraged the slum settlements and had not released 
fundamental information as to the risks of living near the waste storage site. He 
furthermore maintained that he had not had access to an effective remedy to complain 
of the breach of his rights. 
The Grand Chamber firstly observed that States' positive obligation to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction 'must be 
construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which 
the right to life may be at stake and a fortiori in the case of industrial activities, which 
by their very nature are dangerous, such as the operation of waste-collection sites. ' 321 
The Court established that Article 2 was applicable to the facts of the case and went 
on to consider compliance with this provision. 
As to the substantive aspect of Article 2, the Grand Chamber recalled that the positive 
obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life entailed a primary duty on the 
State to put in place 'a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. ' 322 It further maintained that 
this obligation indisputably applied to dangerous activities, where, 'special emphasis 
must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity in 
question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives'. 323 
The Court noted that several factors showed that the authorities were aware of the 
situation endangering the rights of the victims and, accordingly, they were under a 
positive obligation to take action to safeguard them. The Grand Chamber considered 
that in abstracto Turkish legislation offered satisfactory safety regulations in the 
matter of the dispute. The Court, however, agreed with the Chamber that in practice 
that had not been the case. 324 
The Grand Chamber established that de facto the State's policies encouraged the 
construction of slum dwellings, creating a widespread situation of legal uncertainty as 
to the enforcement of town planning regulations. In the Court's view, these factors 
undermined the Government's claiming that the responsibility for the illegal 
dwellings to be attributed to the victims of the accident. The Court also agreed that 
access to information represented a fundamental corollary to the obligations of the 
authorities, which had remained equally unfulfilled. 
320 6nery!ld1z v. Turkey, GC, at 78. The Government also lamented the fact that the Court was not entitled to 
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These considerations led the Grand Chamber unanimously to conclude that the State 
officials and authorities had not done everything within their power to protect the 
victims from the dangers to which they were exposed, thus constituting a substantive 
violation of Article 2 in its own right.325 
As to the procedural aspects of Article 2, the Grand Chamber recalled that this 
provision entailed a duty on the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an 
adequate response -judicial or otherwise - so that the legislative and administrative 
framework set up to protect the right to life was properly implemented and any 
breaches of that right were repressed and punished.326 In particular, the Court asserted 
the importance of the instruments of criminal liability in cases of loss of life where 
'the true circumstances of the death are, or may be, largely confined within the 
knowledge of State officials or authorities. ' 327 In this respect, the Court maintained 
that the fact that those responsible for endangering life had not been charged with a 
criminal offence nor prosecuted 'may amount to a violation of Article 2, irrespective 
of any other types of remedy which individuals may exercise on their own 
initiative. ' 328 In this connection the Court found that it was its task of reviewing 
whether the domestic courts had submitted the case to the careful scrutiny required by 
Article 2, to ensure that 'the deterrent effect of the judicial system in place and the 
significance of the role it is required to play in preventing violations of the right to 
life' were not undermined. 329 
For these reasons, the Court Stated that, on the facts of the case, the administrative 
remedy could not be taken into consideration for purposes of the procedural aspect of 
Article 2, regardless of its outcome. 330 On the other hand, the Court observed that the 
Turkish criminal justice system had not secured the full accountability of State 
officials or authorities for their role in the tragedy and the effective respect for the 
right to life through the deterrent instruments of criminal law. ' 331 Accordingly, the 
Grand Chamber held by sixteen votes to one that there had been a violation of Article 
2 also in its procedural aspect. 
With regard to the allegations of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention, 
the Government submitted that, also with reference to this provision, the Chamber had 
operated an undue opening to the protection of a situation that had no equals in the 
case law of the Court. 332 
The Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber that, as the State authorities had 
tolerated the applicant's actions, they had de facto 'acknowledged that the applicant 
and his close relatives had a proprietary interest in their dwelling and movable 
goods.' 333 The Court therefore established that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
Convention was applicable to the facts of the case. 
325 Oneryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at I 09-110. 
326 Onerytldtz v. Turkey, GC, at 91. 
327 Oneryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 93. 
328 Onery1ldtz v. Turkey, GC, at 93. 
329 Oneryildtz v. Turkey, GC, at 96. 
330 Onery1ldtz v. Turkey, GC, at 93. 
331 Onery1ldtz v. Turkey, GC, at 117. 
332 Oneryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 131. 
333 Onerytldtz v. Turkey, GC, at 127. 
51 
The Grand Chamber confirmed that the causal link between the gross negligence 
attributable to the State and the loss of human lives also applied to the engulfment of 
the applicant's house/34 as the wide margin of appreciation left to States in the 
fulfillment of their obligations did not absolve them from 'their duty to act in good 
time, in an appropriate and, above all, consistent manner. ' 335 
Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons as those given in respect of the 
complaint of a violation of Article 2, the Grand Chamber found by fifteen votes to 
two that there had been a breach of Article I of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 
Contrary to the Chamber, the Grand Chamber thought it necessary to consider the 
facts of the case also in the context of Article 13, 'as it does not inevitably follow that 
Article 13 will be violated if the criminal investigation or resultant trial in a 
particular case do not satisfy the State's procedural obligation under Article 2. ' 336 In 
particular, the Court Stated that meanwhile under Article 2 it had to establish whether 
the authorities had carried out an investigation of their own motion into the cause of 
loss of life, satisfying certain minimal conditions and enabling the individuals 
concerned to obtain relief, 337 in the context of Article 13, vice versa, it was a matter of 
determining whether 'the applicant's exercise of an effective remedy was frustrated 
on account of the manner in which the authorities discharged their procedural 
obligation under Article 2. ' 338 
The Grand Chamber observed that the administrative remedy available to the 
applicant was in abstracto suitable to offer redress to his complaints. However, the 
practical enforcement of this instrument had proved defective, due to excessive 
lengths of the proceedings and non-enforcement of the judgments. The Grand 
Chamber concluded, by fifteen votes to two, that domestic authorities had failed to 
provide the applicant with an effective remedy for the breach of the substantive right 
protected under Article 2 of the Convention. 
As to breach of Article 1 of Protocol 1, the Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber 
that domestic authorities had failed to protect the interest of the applicant, which 
amounted to a de facto proprietary right. The Court reiterated the remarks made in 
connection with the inadequacy in the administrative proceedings under Article 2, 
concluding that 'in so far as these advantages have proved incapable of removing 
from the applicant his status as the victim of an alleged violation of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1, they cannot a fortiori deprive him of his right to an effective remedy in 
order to obtain redress for that alleged violation. ' 339 
The Grand Chamber did not consider it necessary to proceed to scrutinise the facts of 
the case also on grounds of the provisions under Article 6 and 8 of the Convention. In 
awarding compensation to the applicant, the Court substantially reconfirmed the 
overall assessment of the Chamber, granting to the applicant and his children 143,770 
EUR for non-pecuniary damage and 2,000 USD for pecuniary damage. 
334 6nerylld1z v. Turkey, GC, at 135. 
335 6nerylld1z v. Turkey, GC, at 128. 
336 6neryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 148. 
337 6neryi1diz v. Turkey, GC, at 149. 
338 6nery11d1z v. Turkey, GC, at 149. 
339 6neryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 156. 
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The decisions of the 6nerylid1z v. Turkey case may be regarded as landmarks in the 
matter of access to justice in environmental matters in several respects. Here for the 
first time the Court uncontroversially established that public authorities are required 
to take measures to prevent infringements of the right to life as a result of the exercise 
of dangerous activities such as waste storage. 
In the Court's opinion, this involved putting in place legislative and administrative 
frameworks governing the exercise of dangerous activities; 340 measures granting 
public access to information concerning such activities;341 and appropriate procedures 
for identifying shortcomings in the exercise of such activities. 342 
On the preventive side, public authorities were required to put in place legislative and 
administrative frameworks including 'the licensing, setting up, operation, security 
and supervision' of the waste storage, making it compulsory for all those concerned to 
'take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives 
might be endangered by the inherent risks.' 343 The Court exercised close scrutiny of 
the action taken by the State authorities, concluding that, although it is was not its task 
of substituting the views of domestic authorities, it observed that 'the timely 
installation of a gas-extraction system ( ... ) before the situation became fatal could 
have been an effective measure. ' 344 
The fact that the Court was ready to stress the importance of prevention of the loss of 
life through the implementation of environmental regulations represents a decisive 
novelty within the framework of the Convention. Even more, the fact that the Court 
proved willing to scrutinise the domestic authorities' actions in this respect breaks 
new grounds as to the traditional deference to State s' margin of appreciation, as 
shown by the remarks concerning the practical measures that could have been 
adopted. 345 
These data seem to confirm a new attitude in the Court, which proved itself willing to 
go into the merits of domestic authorities' decisions, as seen in the context of the case 
law under Article 8. Also in the 6nerylld1z case the Court was faced with a situation 
of widespread breach of domestic regulations. Contrary to Article 8, though, domestic 
illegitimacy is not a prerequisite for the application of Article 2. 
The 6nerylid1z judgments placed particular emphasis on the public's right to 
information concerning such activities, extending to Article 2 the principles 
elaborated in the context of Article 8.346 Additionally, the Court stressed the crucial 
importance of appropriate procedures 'for ident~fjling shortcomings in the processes 
concerned and any errors committed by those responsible at different levels,' 347 in 
order to provide 'effective deterrence against threats to the right to life. ' 348 
340 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, at 89-90. 
341 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, at 90. 
342 6neryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 90. 
343 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, at 90. 
344 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, at 107. 
345 Cf. 6neryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 90: 'The licensing, setting up, operation, security and supervision' of the waste 
storage, making it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection 
of citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks.' 
346 Oneryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 90; cf. case of Guerra and others v Italy, at 60. 
347 6neryild1z v. Turkey, GC, at 90. 
348 Ibidem. 
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These general conditions are well-established in the context of law enforcement under 
Article 2, according to which, if infringement of the right to life is not intentional, 
civil, administrative or even disciplinary remedies may be a sufficient response. 349 In 
the 6nery1ldiz judgment, however, the Court, found that where the public authorities 
knew of certain risks and knew that the consequences of not taking action to reduce 
those risks could lead to the loss of life, then the State was under an obligation to 
prosecute those responsible for criminal offences.350 Hence an enlargement of the 
guarantees of Article 2 in the field of activities that, in the words of the respondent 
State, did not fall within the notion of activities posing an immediate danger within 
the meaning of the Court's case law. 351 
The core of the authorities' wrongdoing appears to have been their failure to 
discourage the applicant and other slum dwellers from living near the waste tip 
creating the risks. This interpretation, though, has been criticised by some 
commentators as constructing a bridge of dubious logicality between the use of lethal 
force, in the Article 2 sense and the Government's omission to remove the slum 
dwellers from the risks posed by the waste storage site.352 The Court seems indeed to 
have placed a great burden upon State authorities. 
This interpretation of Article 2 leaves the observer wondering how State authorities 
could have shifted the risk to the individual, discharging their obligations to protect 
the right to life. In the 6neryild1z case the assessment was relatively easy, as domestic 
authorities had not put in place any preventive measures to safeguard the lives of the 
slum population, nor they had made any effort to inform them of the risks they run, 
albeit these had been clear for a substantial amount time. In this respect, it seems fair 
to assume that, had public authorities seriously attempted to evict the applicant, 
making clear of the risks he would have run otherwise, the Court would have 
probably taken a different decision. It is however worth remembering that the Court 
expressly mentioned that in absence of more practical measures to avoid the risks to 
the lives of the slums' inhabitants, even the fact of having respected the right to 
information would not have been sufficient to absolve the State of its 
responsibilities. 353 
The Chamber and Grand Chamber took different standpoints as to interpretation of 
obligations under Article 2. Meanwhile the Chamber had subordinated the finding of 
a violation of Article 2 to a breach of its procedural guarantees, the Grand Chamber 
distinguished the two issues. 354 In this regard, the Grand Chamber found that there 
was a need to assess the facts of the case also under Article 13, clarifying the role of 
this provision in the context of Article 2 ( cf. retro ). 
349 Onerylld1z v. Turkey, GC, at 94. Cf. Yo v France, GC, Application No. 53924/00, at 90; Calvelli and Ciglio v 
Italy, GC, No. 32967/96, at 51; Mastromatteo v Italy, Application No. 37703/99, GC at 90, 94 and 95. 
35° Cf. Oneryildiz v. Turkey, GC, at 93: 'Where it is established that the negligence attributable to State officials or 
bodies on that account goes beyond an error of judgment or carelessness, in that the authorities in question, fully 
realizing the likely consequences and disregarding the powers vested in them, failed to take measures that were 
necessary and sufficient to avert the risks inherent in a dangerous activity (see, mutatis mutandis, Osman, at 116}, 
the fact that those responsible for endangering life have not been charged with a criminal offence or prosecuted 
may amount to a violation of Article 2'. 
351 Oneryiid1z v. Turkey, GC, at 77. 
352 Case review for one Crown Row, R. available at: www.lcor.com. 
353 Onerylld1z v. Turkey GC, at I 08 
354 Onerylld1z v. Turkey GC, at 88. 
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As to violation of Article I of Protocol I to the Convention, the Court established that 
governments have duties to protect persons occupying land without planning 
permission. In effect the Court seems to have recognised that tolerance of national 
authorities constituted a valid criterion for the determination of possession, thus 
departing from the consolidated notion elaborated in its case law. 355 In particular, the 
Court seems to have acknowledged that State authorities cannot dispute the title to 
land unless they are in a position to claim that they have undertaken some action to 
evict the applicants from unlawfully occupied land.356 This view has raised some 
criticisms357 and it remains to be seen whether the Court will prove willing to stick 
with it. 
Overall, the call for effectiveness of domestic regimes concerning dangerous activities 
made in this judgment is most interesting when one considers the well-known 
problem of lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. The line established by 
the Court's decision allows predicting that the right to life may be employed to 
complain of domestic authorities' failure to implement environmental legislation, as 
far as it is aimed to protect from risks to human life. The Court is not going to be 
satisfied with purely theoretical risks and only very serious threats can fit into the 
pattern drawn by the 6neryzld1z decision. Accordingly, the identification of a clear 
and direct casual link would remain the most crucial hurdle to overcome to present 
claims based on analogous grounds. 
355 Ibidem. 
356Cf. contra Chapman v UK, where the Court had established that it would be slow 'to grant protection to those 
who, in conscious defiance of the prohibitions of the law, establish a home on an environmentally protected site', 
Chapman v UK, Application No. 27238/95, at 102. 
357 Case review for one Crown Row, cit. 
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4. Procedural rights: the right to a fair trial, the right to a remedy 
and the right to access to information 
Environmental protection may hugely benefit of the implementation of procedural 
guarantees associated with existing civil and political rights, which could allow 
citizens to play a substantial role in the control on environmentally sensitive human 
activities and the implementation of environmental regulations. The Council of 
Europe's Committee of Ministers has recognised the need to 'emphasise the need to 
strengthen environmental protection at national level, notably as concerns access to 
information, participation in decision-making processes and access to justice in 
environmental matters. ' 358 These undertakings also represent the object of the Aarhus 
Convention,359 signed by many contracting parties to the European Convention of 
Human Rights. This section will ascertain how the procedural guarantees laid out in 
the Convention may operate within this context. 
The right to a fair trial 
According to Article 6 ( 1) of the Convention: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment will be 
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the 
trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the Court's opinion in special 
circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests ofjustice. 
The right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 is one of the cornerstones of the rule of 
law. The norm applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. The present paper, 
however, will confine itself only to analyse the deployment of this provision with 
regard to civil rights and obligations. In this connection, Article 6 works as a 
procedural safeguard for the protection of the rights laid out in domestic law, granting 
access to a fair and public hearing before an impartial and independent tribunal 
established by law. The right entails access to a public judgment within a reasonable 
time and in respect of the principle of equality of arms. Article 6 does not just cover 
the right to instigate proceedings to which the fair standards will apply, but also 
extends to the execution of sentences. 360 
According to the Court's established case law, in order to fall within the field of 
application of Article 6, civil rights and obligations that may be at least arguably said 
to be recognised under domestic law must be the object of a dispute, which is directly 
decisive to them. 361 
358 CM/860/21012004, adopted on 23 January 2004. 
359 ECE/CEP/43 adopted on 25 June 1998 by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and entered 
into force on 30 October 200 I. Cf. retro, Chapter I. 
360 Hornsby v Greece, Application No. 18357/91, at 40: 'Execution of a judgment given by any court must 
therefore be regarded as an integral part of the 'trial' for the purposes of Article 6.' 
361 Cf. LeCompte, VanLeuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, Application No. 7496/76, at 47. 
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Article 6 does not guarantee any particular content in the substantive law of 
Contracting States and merely relates to whatever substantive legal rights and 
obligations a State in its discretion provides.362 The notion of civil rights and 
obligations has autonomous Convention meaning, which has not been defined in 
general terms. In this regard, the Court makes reference to the character, the 
substantive content and effects of rights363 and, subsidiarity, to their legal classification 
in domestic law and the existence of a uniform European notion on the matter. 364 
Article 6 comes into play when a civil right or obligation is the subject of a dispute. 365 
The contestation may relate both to a question of law or fact and may concern the 
existence and the scope of a right, or the manner in which it is exercised. 366 There is 
no need for the victim to be in a position to claim for damage and a request for 
declaratory judgment is sufficient. Equally, it is not necessary that both parties are 
private persons/67 and the right may also be invoked by citizens' associations bringing 
proceedings in order to defend the interests of their members. 368 
The dispute must be arguable, genuine and serious, entailing that the applicant's 
arguments are sufficiently tenable, but not necessarily well-founded in terms of 
domestic legislation. 369 The outcome of the dispute must be decisive for the rights in 
question. In this respect, the Court has established that 'tenuous connections or 
remote consequences are not sufficient. ' 370 
In considering claims under Article 6 the Court scrutinizes the legitimate aim and 
proportionality of the measures deployed in domestic law, as 'it would not be 
consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with the basic principle 
underlying Article 6 para. 1 ( ... ) if, for example, a State could, without restraint or 
control by the Convention enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of the 
courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from civil liability on large 
groups or categories of persons. ' 371 
Article 6 is one of the most litigated provisiOns of the Convention and its broad 
spectrum of protection may apply to some environmental interests. 372 Domestic 
legislation in fact may contain individual entitlements associated with certain 
environmental conditions, such as the right to a clean environment provided by some 
European Constitutions, amounting to civil rights within the meaning of Article 6. 
Equally, this provision may work as a procedural guarantee of domestic law schemes 
362 H v Belgium, Application No. 8950/80, at 40: 'Article 6 § I (art. 6-1) extends only to "contestations" (disputes) 
over (civil) "rights and obligations" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under 
domestic law; it does not in itself guarantee any particular content for (civil) "rights and obligations" in the 
substantive law of the Contracting States.' 
363 Konig v Germany, Application No. 6232/73, at 89-90. 
364 Feldbrugge v Netherlands, Application No. 8562/79, at 29. 
365 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, cit, at 47 and, later, Balmer Schafroth and others v 
Switzerland, cit., at 32. 
366 Fayed v UK, Application No. 17101/90, at 65. 
367 Ringeisen v Austria, Application No. 2614/65, at 94. 
368 Gorraiz Lizarraga and others v Spain, Application No. 62543/00, at 46. 
369 Neves e Silva v Portugal, ApplicationNo. ll213/84; at 37. 
37° Cf. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, cit., at 47: 'The Court considers that a tenuous 
connection or remote consequences do not suffice for Article 6 par. I.' 
371 Fayed v UK, cit., at 65. 
372 See Balmer-Schafroth and others v. Switzerland, at 33; Athanassoglou and others v. Switzerland, at 44; Taskm 
and others v. Turkey, at 90. 
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that enable concerned individuals to institute public law proceedings for the 
enforcement of environmental regulations. In spite of these theoretical possibilities, 
the early decisions taken in this field were fairly discouraging. 
In Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland,373 for example, the applicants were 10 
Swiss nationals who lived near a nuclear power station and had tried to object to the 
renewal of the plant's operating licence, arguing that it was obsolete and threatened 
the lives and health of the neighbouring population. The Swiss Federal Council had 
recognised the applicants' entitlement to present their. objections, but it had set them 
aside as unfounded, granting a renewed licence as requested. In their submissions to 
the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants complained of not having had 
access to a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6. They further alleged a breach of 
their rights under Article 13 for lack of access to an effective remedy. 
The Swiss Government disputed the status of the applicants as victims within the 
meaning of the Convention. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the fact 
that the Federal Council had declared the applicants' objections admissible justified 
regarding them as victims under the Convention. 374 As it proceeded to examine the 
facts of the case under Article 6, the Court observed that the right to have physical 
integrity adequately protected from risks associated with the use of nuclear energy 
was recognized by Swiss law, therefore constituting a civil right. 375 The Court further 
found that there had been a dispute over this right, as the substantial nature of the 
decision of the Federal Council was 'more akin to a judicial act than to a general 
policy decision. ' 376 
As the Court went on to consider whether this decision had also been decisive to the 
applicants' rights, it found that the latter had failed to show that the operation of the 
power station exposed them personally to a danger that was not only serious but also 
specific and, above all, imminent. 377 In the absence of such evidence, neither the 
dangers nor the remedies were established with a degree of probability that made the 
outcome of the proceedings directly decisive within the meaning of the Article 6.378 
Accordingly, since the connection between the Federal Council's decision and the 
right invoked by the applicants was too tenuous and remote, the Court concluded that 
neither Article 6 nor Article 13 were applicable to the facts ofthe case. 
The ruling was by a majority. A 7 judges minority compiled a dissenting opinion 
disputing that the link between the operating licence and the applicants' rights was too 
tenuous. 379 The dissenting judges also observed that the applicants had not sought to 
challenge the Swiss energy policies in abstracto, further commenting that: 
'What applies to the supervision of quarries, motorways and waste-disposal sites 
applies a fortiori to nuclear energy and the operation of power stations required to 
comply with safety standards. If there is a field in which blind trust cannot be placed 
373 Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland, Application No. 2211 0/93._ 
374 Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland, at 26. 
375 Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland, at 34. 
376 Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland, at 37. 
377 Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland, at 40. 
378 Ibidem. 
379 Dissenting opinion by Judges Pettiti, Golcuklu, Walsh, Russo, Valticos, Lopes-Rocha and Jambrek, appended 
to the judgement. 
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in the executive, it is nuclear power, because reasons of State, the demands of 
government, the interests concerned and pressure from lobbyists are more pressing 
than in other spheres.' 380 
In spite of the advanced standpoint taken by the dissenting judges, the reasoning 
applied in the Balmer-Schafroth case was confirmed in Athanassoglou and others v 
Switzerlan(f8 1 and Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg. 382 
The case of Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland dealt with a situation virtually 
identical to that complained of in the Balmer-Schafroth case. The applicants asked the 
Court to distinguish between the procedural right to examination by a domestic court 
of the governmental decision to grant an extension of the operating licence of a 
nuclear power plant and, on the other hand, the possible right to have the plant closed 
under national law.383 As far as the procedural Convention right was concerned, they 
maintained, it should be sufficient only to prove the serious nature of the risk. If proof 
of immediate danger in the sense of imminent risk of serious accident had to be 
furnished, there would no longer have been any difference in practice between 
procedural and substantive law. 384 
The Court rejected this argument, finding that there was no material difference between 
the present case and that of Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland. 385 In the 
Court's opinion, the applicants had sought to derive from Article 6 a remedy to 
contest the very principle of the use of nuclear energy, or at the least a means for 
transferring from the government to the courts the responsibility for taking the 
ultimate decision on the operation of individual nuclear power stations. 386 The Court, 
however, considered that how best to regulate the use of nuclear power was a policy 
decision for each Contracting State to take according to its democratic processes and 
that it was not for it to examine the hypothetical question whether, if the applicants 
had been able to demonstrate a serious, specific and imminent danger, the national 
remedies would have been sufficient to satisfy the Article requirements. 387 
Consequently, the Court found that there had been no violation of Article 6. The same 
reasoning was applied in Asselbourg and others v Luxembourg, for whose analysis cf. 
retro, Chapter 2. In these decisions the Court placed a heavy burden of proof on the 
applicants, displaying clear closure to any attempts to rely on Article 6 made by 
individuals concerned for the implementation of domestic regulations on the exercise 
of hazardous activities. 
In 2003, nevertheless, a new view emerged, with the decision of Kyrtatos v Greece. 388 
As recalled earlier in this paper,389 the applicants were two Greek citizens owning a 
property near a nature reserve, who claimed that the building of an urban development 
adjacent to their home had led to the destruction of their physical environment, in 
380 Ibidem. 
381 Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland, Application No. 27644/95. 
382 Asselbourg v Luxembourg, Application No. 29121/95. 
383 Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland, at 38. 
384 Ibidem. 
385 Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland, at 51. 
386 Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland, at 53. 
387 Athanassoglou and others v Switzerland, at 54. 
388 Kyrtatos v Greece, Application No. 41666/98. 
389 Cf. Chapter 2. 
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breach of their rights under Article 8. 390 The Court rejected this claim as unfounded. 
The applicants, however, also complained of domestic authorities' failure to comply 
with two final decisions that had annulled the building permits for the urban 
development. These judgments were grounded on constitutional provisions on the 
protection of the natural environment.391 The applicants argued that the failure to 
enforce these decisions, together with the length of the related proceedings, had 
breached their rights under Article 6. 
The Court observed that the right to a fair trial 'would be illus01y if a Contracting 
State's domestic legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain 
inoperative to the detriment of one party. >392 Accordingly, in the Court's opinion the 
Greek authorities had breached the applicants' rights under Article 6 by refraining for 
more than 7 years from taking the necessary measures to comply with two final 
judicial decisions. The Court equally found a breach of the same provision in the 
length of the proceedings complained of and the applicants were awarded 10,000 and 
20,000 EUR respectively for non-pecuniary damage. 
This was the first decision in which the Court applied the well-established principles 
elaborated under Article 6 to an environmental case, based upon the right to a healthy 
environment protected in a national Constitution. The fact that the applicants could 
rely on a ruling by a domestic court represented the landmark distinguishing this case 
from the precedent set in Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland. This feature 
characterized the developments in Article 6 jurisprudence over the following years. 
In 2004 the decision of Taskin and others v Turke/93 reconfirmed the application of 
Article 6 to environmental cases. As recalled earlier in this paper, the applicants 
argued that the operation of a gold mine near their homes posed a threat to human 
health, wildlife and water supplies, causing them to suffer the consequences of 
environmental damage. 394 They maintained that the permits issued to the mine and the 
related decision-making process violated their rights under Articles 2 and 8 of the 
Convention further claiming that they had been denied access to effective judicial 
protection, contrary to Article 6 and 13. 
The Government disputed that Article 6 applied to the facts of the case, as the risks 
complained of by the applicants were too remote to constitute civil rights relevant to 
the Convention. The Court, however, found that, in the instant case, the fact that the 
domestic courts had acknowledged breach of the applicants' rights was sufficient to 
conclude that there had been a genuine dispute over a civil right, relevant to the 
purposes of Article 6. In this respect, the Court also established that domestic 
authorities' failure to comply with the ruling of national courts had deprived Article 6 
39° Kyrtatos v Greece, at 44. 
391 Cf. Kyrtatos v Greece, at 12: 'The basic argument of the applicants before the Supreme Administrative Court 
was that the prefect's decisions and consequently the building permits, were illegal because in the area concerned 
there was a swamp and Article 24 of the Greek Constitution, which protects the environment, provided that no 
settlement should be built in such a place.' And at 13: 'The decision was found to have violated Article 24 of the 
Constitution, which protects the environment, because the redrawing of the boundaries of the settlements put in 
jeopardy the swamp in Ayios Hyannis, an important natural habitat for various protected species (such as birds, 
fishes and sea-turtles). It followed that the building permits were also unlawful and had to be quashed.' 
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of any useful effect.395 It is furthermore notable that the judgment contained a section 
mentioning the Rio Declaration on Environment and Developmene96 and the Aarhus 
Convention amongst the relevant international texts on the right to a healthy 
environment. 397 
These findings seemed to constitute an evolution in the Court's jurisprudence, 
comparable to that observed under Article 8. As may be recalled, once established 
that the Court was not willing to rule against policies considered legitimate at the 
domestic level ( cf. Hatton and others v UK), applicants started to bring successful 
environmental claims under Article 8 with reference to situations that had been 
acknowledged illegitimate by domestic courts (Taskin and others v Turkey and 
subsequent case law). Analogously, in the context of Article 6, although the Court 
was not willing to go against the findings of domestic courts in matters of access to 
justice in environmental controversies (Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland), it 
acknowledged claims grounded on domestic judgments that had remained unenforced, 
(Kyrtatos v Greece and subsequent case law). 
This line saw a further interesting development in 2005, with the decision of Okyay 
and others v Turkey. 398 The applicants were 10 Turkish nationals complaining of 
domestic authorities' failure to implement an order to shut down three highly 
polluting thermal-power plants. All the applicants were lawyers who lived and 
practised in the city of Izmir, about 250 kilometres from the sites subject to dispute.399 
They had successfully challenged the operation of the plants before the domestic 
courts, relying on their constitutional right to live in a healthy and balanced 
environment and on the related duty to prevent environmental pollution. The domestic 
courts had ordered the closure of the plants, but their decisions had never been 
enforced. According to the applicants, this amounted to a breach of their rights under 
Article 6. 
The Government disputed that the applicants were in a position to invoke a breach of 
their right to a fair hearing in the determination of their civil rights, as they could not 
claim to have a right under domestic law, but rather a mere interest.400 The 
Government furthermore argued that the applicants had failed to show that the power 
plants' operation exposed them personally to a danger that was serious, specific and 
imminent. In this respect, the Government observed that the applicants had not at any 
stage claimed of having suffered any economic or other loss, but, admittedly, they 
were simply concerned about their country's environmental policies and wished to 
live in a healthier environment. Consequently, in the Government's submissions, the 
proceedings at issue were not directly decisive to the applicants' civil rights.401 
The Court found that, although the applicants had not claimed of having suffered any 
specific loss, they had relied on their constitutional right to live in a healthy and 
balanced environment, which had been regarded as sufficient to ground their claim by 
395 Taskin and others v Turkey, at 133. 
396 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, A/CONF.l51/26 (Vol. I). 
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domestic courts. This satisfied the Court as to the existence of a dispute over a civil 
right.402 
As to the Government's submissions that the applicants had failed to show that the 
power plants' operation exposed them personally to a danger, which was serious, 
specific and imminent, the Court noted that, according to the domestic courts' 
findings, the hazardous gases emitted by the power plants extended to an area 2,350 
kilometres in diameter. The Court noticed that the distance reached to cover the area 
where the applicants lived, causing some interference with their right to the protection 
of their physical integrity, making the dispute decisive to the civil rights at stake. The 
Court explicitly elaborated that the present case differed from the authorities relied on 
by the Government, notably the Balmer-Schafroth and Athanassoglou cases, where 
the applicants had been unable to secure a ruling by a tribunal on their objections to 
the extension of the operating permits of nuclear power plants.403 
The Court further highlighted that the domestic courts had recognized the applicants' 
right to demand the suspension of the power plants' activities and to set aside the 
administrative authorities' decision to continue to operate them. In the Court's 
opinion, any administrative decision to refuse or circumvent these judgments paved 
the way for compensation. As the execution of judicial decisions was an integral part 
of the right to a fair trial, the Court concluded that there had been a breach of the 
applicants' rights under this provision.404 
The applicants had not claimed compensation for pecuniary damage or costs and 
expenses, but they had claimed non-pecuniary damage for the emotional suffering and 
distress caused by the non-enforcement of the administrative courts' decisions. The 
Court awarded them the sum of 1,000 EUR each under this head. 
The contextualisation of this decision in the case law of the Court highlights some 
interesting features. The case bears clear similarities to the decision of Taskin and 
others v Turkey, under its Article 6 limb, as both claims related to the lack of 
enforcement of domestic judicial decisions. In both instances, the applicants had 
relied on their constitutional right to a healthy environment granted by national 
constitutions. The most significant difference between the two, however, is that, 
although none of the applicants could claim for actual damage to their personal 
sphere, in Taskin and others v Turkey the applicants resided in the very area where the 
mine was in operation; meanwhile in Okyay and others v Turkey they resided 250 
kilometres away. This detail clearly affected the level of risk to which they were 
exposed, which was 'not as serious, specific and imminent as that run by those living 
in the immediate vicinity of the plants. ' 405 
In Okyay and others v Turkey the applicants could not prove nor did they seek to 
prove any physical or material damage to their persons or property, but rather relied 
on their constitutional right to a healthy and clean environment and on their interest in 
obtaining observance of domestic regulations. These features confer on the case some 
402 Okyay and others v. Turkey, at 65. 403 Okyay and others v. Turkey, at 68. 
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characteristics of a class action, grounded on generic public interest, rather than on an 
individual right. 
In conclusion, it seems to be possible to maintain that, after the Kyrtatos v Greece 
judgment, the Court considered that the applicants' constitutional rights to a healthy 
environment were civil rights relevant to the purposes of Article 6. These decisions 
pave the way for access to the European Court of Human Rights to citizens taking 
action for environmental protection in State s whose constitutions provide for a right 
to a healthy environment, whenever their right of standing is acknowledged by 
domestic courts. The Court seems to have progressively taken the standpoint of not 
asking applicants to demonstrate a serious, specific and imminent danger in their 
personal regard, being satisfied by the assessment carried about by domestic courts in 
this respect. 
Equality of arms 
The principle of equality of arms is another feature of the right to a fair trial, requiring 
that 'each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his 
opponent. ' 406 States enjoy a wide margin of discretion as to the means to be used in 
guaranteeing litigants this right, the institution of legal aid being one of these means. 
According to the Court's established jurisprudence, the question whether the 
provision of legal aid is necessary to a fair hearing must be determined on the basis of 
the particular facts and circumstances of each case and depends, inter alia, upon the 
importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of 
the relevant law and procedure and the applicant's capacity to represent him or herself 
effectively.407 
The Court has long confined itself into applying this principle to civil cases only in 
exceptional circumstances, where the provision of legal aid was indispensable for 
effective access to court. A most interesting occasion for testing the use of this norm 
in the context of claims of an environmental nature occurred in Steel and Morris v 
UK.408 The claim related to the possibility of resort to the principle of the equality of 
arms under Article 6 in cases of defamation associated with environmental 
campatgns. 
The applicants were two activists belonging to a local British NGO that had been 
campaigning against the McDonald's corporation. The campaign included allegations 
that McDonald caused starvation in developing countries, destruction of tropical 
forests and torture and murder of animals. McDonald had brought a legal action 
against the applicants, claiming damage for defamation. The applicants, who disposed 
of little financial resources, had applied for legal aid, but their application was refused 
and they were forced to represent themselves throughout the whole of the 
proceedings. The trial was the longest in English legal history and resulted in the 
condemnation of the applicants to pay damage for 36,000£ and 40,000£ respectively. 
Before the European Court ofHuman Rights the applicants complained that they had 
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been denied a fair trial because of the lack of legal aid. Although they had received 
pro bono assistance by barristers and solicitors, the applicants maintained that the 
domestic proceedings had been impaired by a staggering inequality of arms, resulting 
into a violation of Article 6. The Government, on the other hand, submitted that, 
according to the consolidated jurisprudence of the Court, the non-availability of legal 
aid in cases of defamation had never been found to be in breach of the Convention. 
The Government further submitted that the present case did not display any 
exceptional circumstances that would make legal aid indispensable for effective 
access to court. 
The Court disagreed with these submissions. In its opinion, the circumstances of the 
case - namely the fact that the applicants had not chosen to commence defamation 
proceedings, but had acted as defendants in order to protect their right to freedom of 
expression, together with the financial impact of the domestic courts' decisions and 
the complexity of the case at issue - demanded an assessment of the extent to which 
the applicants had been able to bring an effective defence. 409 In this regard, the Court 
established that the disparity between the respective levels of legal assistance was of 
such a degree that it had given raise to unfairness.410 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the denial of legal aid had deprived the 
applicants of the opportunity to present their case effectively before a court, with 
breach of Article 6. The claim further contained an Article 10 limb, which will be 
analyzed further in this Chapter. The applicants were awarded respectively 20,000 
and 15,000 EUR in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and 47,311£ in legal 
expenses. 
This judgment introduced an important instrument for campaigners with 
environmental concerns attempting to challenge the policies of private corporations. 
In this respect, the Court acknowledged that, although it lay within the Contracting 
Parties' discretion whether to allow corporations to sue in defamation, this remedy 
needed to be accompanied by the safeguard of countervailing interests of freedom of 
expression and open debate, through the provision of instruments of legal aid.411 This 
decision therefore marked a fairly advanced protection of the role of campaign groups 
in stimulating public discussion on environmental matters, consistently expanding the 
application of legal aid guarantees under Article 6. 
The right to a remedy 
According to Article 13 of the Convention: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated will 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
Article 13 enshrines the right to an effective national remedy for violations of the 
rights contained in the Convention. As emerges from the travaux preparatoires, the 
409 Steel and Morris v UK, at 67. 
410 Steel and Morris v UK, at 72 and 98. 
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aim of this norm is to provide a means whereby individuals can obtain relief at the 
national level for violations of rights set out in the Convention, before having to resort 
to the complaint machinery before the European Court of Human Rights.412 
According to the Court's jurisprudence, the object of Article 13 is to 'enforce the 
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen 
to be secured in the domestic legal order. ' 413 The norm requires that where an 
individual considers himself to have been prejudiced by a measure allegedly in breach 
of the Convention, he should have a remedy before a national authority 'in order both 
to have his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress. ' 414 Thus Article 13 
must be interpreted as guaranteeing an effective remedy before a national authority to 
everyone who claims that his rights and freedoms under the Convention have been 
violated. 
The protection afforded by this norm is auxiliary to that provided by the substantive 
rights listed in the Convention. However, violations of Article 13 do not depend on 
the finding of breaches of substantive provisions and, in this respect, it is simply 
enough that an arguable claim be made, although not manifestly unfounded.415 The 
Court has not elaborated a general definition of arguability, making its assessment on 
a case-by-case basis.416 The substantive rights invoked, are material to identify the 
States' obligations in each case. 
The criterion of effectiveness requires that domestic systems provide the possibility to 
dispute a breach of the Convention with a realistic hope of success. Applicants are not 
entitled to a favorable decision; however, should the domestic authority find their 
arguments well-founded, they must grant of an effective remedy. The guarantees 
under Article 13 are less stringent than those provided by Article 6. The competent 
authorities do not need to be judicial, but the decision-maker must be sufficiently 
independent of the authority allegedly responsible for the violation of the Convention. 
Although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, 
the aggregate of instruments provided under domestic law may do so. 417 
Article 13 constitutes lex generalis compared with Article 6 and often the norms are 
invoked together. In the environmental field, the provision finds more frequent 
deployment with reference to the right to life, the right to respect for one's home, 
private and family life and the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions. In 
particular, the Court has proved willing to consider Article 13 claims also when it has 
already acknowledged a procedural breach of a substantive right provided by the 
Convention. 
This was the case in Oneryildiz v. Turkey, discussed earlier in this paper. 418 Although 
it had already acknowledged that the national authorities' conduct in relation to the 
death of the applicants' relatives had led to a procedural breach of Article 2, the Court 
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also went on to scrutinize the facts of the case in the light of Article 13.419 In this 
respect, the Court specified that, while under Article 2 it had to establish whether the 
authorities had carried out an investigation of their own motion into the cause of loss 
of life, satisfying certain minimal conditions and enabling the individuals concerned 
to obtain relief,420 in the context of Article 13 it was a matter of determining whether 
'the applicant's exercise of an effective remedy was frustrated on account of the 
manner in which the authorities discharged their procedural obligation under Article 
2. •421 
The Court observed that the applicant had been in a position to use the remedies 
available under Turkish law.422 However, in the Court's opinion, these proceedings 
were incapable of delivering an effective remedy in practice.423 The Court criticized 
the ineffectiveness of the domestic compensation proceedings, concluding that there 
had been a violation of Article 13.424 The same reasoning was applied with reference 
to the violation of applicant's right to the enjoyment of his possessions under Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.425 
As far as Article 8 claims are concerned, applicants have sought to deploy Article 13 
to challenge domestic policies against which they had no remedy under domestic law. 
In Powell and Rayner v UK,426 the applicants disputed the acceptability of the noise 
levels permitted by air traffic regulations, complaining that they breached their rights 
under Article 8. Furthermore, the applicants argued that they had not had access to 
any remedy to complain of these violations, since domestic law exempted aerodromes 
from claims for nuisance. The Court was not ready to endorse these submissions, as it 
found that the applicants had no arguable claim under Article 8. Accordingly, it 
concluded that they were not entitled to a remedy within the meaning of Article 13.427 
The Court, however, later reconsidered its view with the decision of Hatton and 
others v UK. As in Powell and Rayner v UK, the applicants maintained that they had 
not had access to private-law remedies in relation to excessive aircraft noise, as 
domestic law excluded liability for this kind of nuisance. They furthermore submitted 
that the remedy of judicial review, which they could theoretically have resorted, did 
not serve the purposes of Article 13 as it merely allowed to challenge decisions on 
grounds of irrationality, unlawfulness or unreasonableness.428 
In the Court's assessment, although the Article 8 claim had proved unfounded, it was 
nevertheless arguable, therefore entitling the applicants to a remedy under Article 
13.429 The Court observed that the limits posed by judicial review did not allow 
consideration as to whether the increase in night flights represented a justifiable 
419 Cf. 6nery1ldiz v. Turkey, GC, at 148, where the Court maintained that 'it does not inevitably follow that Article 
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limitation on the right to respect for the private and family lives of those who lived in 
the vicinity of Heathrow Airport. In those circumstances, the scope of review by the 
domestic courts had not been sufficient to comply with Article 13.430 
The Hatton judgment represented a crucial moment in the environmental 
jurisprudence of the Court. For purposes of Article 13, this decision marked the first 
precedent in which the norm was successfully invoked to protect the right to 
challenge governmental policies that affected the human environment. The finding of 
an arguable claim in Convention terms remained the main prerequisite in this respect. 
Thus in Ashworth and others v UK,431 where the applicants sought to rely on the 
Hatton ruling to complain of the lack of an effective remedy against the noise 
pollution caused by a private aerodrome, different material circumstances induced the 
Court to conclude that there was no arguable claim under Article 8. 
Article 13 may therefore apply to environmental cases only when it is possible to 
establish a link with a substantive right protected under the Convention. In this 
respect, the general principles apply and, although it is not necessary that a 
substantive right be violated, there needs to be an arguable claim that is not 
manifestly unfounded under the Convention. 
The right of access to information 
The right of access to information is essential to enable individuals to participate in 
decision-making and have a role in the scrutiny of government and private sector 
activities. The European Convention of Human Rights does not explicitly provide a 
right of access to information. This entitlement, however, has been the object of much 
litigation before the Court, as a result of the interpretation of the provisions on 
freedom of expression under Article 10 and of the right to respect of one's home and 
family life under Article 8. 
Applicants have sought to rely on Article 10 in order to demand the disclosure of 
information by public authorities.432 Thus in Guerra and others v Italy, recalled earlier 
in this paper,433 the applicants complained that the authorities' failure to inform them 
about the hazards and procedures to be followed in the event of accident in a nearby 
chemical factory had infringed their freedom to receive and impart information and 
ideas as of Article 10.434 The Commission agreed that this provision had to be 
construed as conferring an actual right to receive information on populations who had 
been or might be affected by an activity representing a threat to the environment.435 
The Court rebutted this interpretation, maintaining that freedom to receive 
information prohibited governments from restricting the public from receiving 
information that others wish or may be willing to impart, but could not be construed 
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as imposing on States positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of 
their own motion.436 
The Court, nevertheless, established that the toxic emissions produced by the plant 
were susceptible of interfering with the applicants' right to respect for their private 
and family life.437 In this connection, although domestic authorities were not directly 
responsible for the emissions, the Court observed that they had failed to spread 
information that was necessary to the protection of the applicants' rights. 438 
Accordingly, the right to receive information was not grounded within freedom of 
expression, but was considered a procedural implication in the context of Article 8. 
In this way the Court supplied a new interpretation of the State's positive obligations, 
including the spreading of information which might enable individuals to assess the 
risks of living near a hazardous site. 439 Already earlier in its jurisprudence, the Court 
had acknowledged that the protection of one's private and family life might require 
access to information.440 However, the Guerra and others v Italy case was the first 
instance in which the Court applied this reasoning to environmental information. 
This line was later confirmed in the judgment of McGinley and Egan v UK, 441 where 
the Court found that 'where a Government engages in hazardous activities( .. .) which 
might have hidden adverse consequences on the health of those involved in such 
activities, respect for private and family life under Article 8 requires that an effective 
and accessible procedure be established which enables such persons to seek all 
relevant and appropriate information'. 442 The case related to domestic authorities' 
failure to disclose information about the applicants' participation in nuclear tests. The 
applicants maintained that the lack of access to the tests records had given place to a 
denial of a fair trial in the context of their applications for service disability pensions. 
They further argued that there had been an unjustifiable interference with their private 
life within the meaning of Article 8, for which they had had no effective domestic 
remedy, contrary to Article 13. 
The Court considered that both Articles 6 and 8 were applicable to the facts of the 
case, but found that there had been no breach of the applicants' rights, as the remedies 
provided at the domestic level, (the so-called Rule 6 procedure), were sufficient to 
satisfy the guarantees provided by the Convention. 
Similar arguments were put forward in Roche v. UK, decided in 2005.443 With close 
analogy to the case of McGinley and Egan, the applicant complained of domestic 
authorities' failure to disclose his medical records relating to his participation in the 
testing of chemical weapons. Contrary to the previous applicants, Mr. Roche had 
engaged into the search of the materials independently of a procedure of application 
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to obtain a pension. The applicant maintained that the lack of access to the records of 
his participation in the tests had breached his right to respect for private and family 
life. He furthermore claimed that he had not had adequate access to a court, contrary 
to Article 6. 
In the Court's view, the applicant's uncertainty as to whether he had been put at risk 
through his participation in the tests could reasonably be expected to have caused him 
substantial anxiety and stress, amounting to an interference with his rights under 
Article 8.444 The Court observed that, although the authorities had a positive obligation 
to provide an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to have access 
to all relevant and appropriate information, they had failed to do so.445 The Court 
further found that the present case differed from that of McGinley and Egan as the 
applicant had pursued the information independently of his application for a 
pension.446 Accordingly, the mechanisms provided by domestic law to allow access to 
documentation for pension applications, (namely the Rule 6 procedure), which had 
been deemed to be sufficient in the previous case, could not be regarded as pertinent 
to the claim of Mr. Roche. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a 
violation both of Articles 8 and 6, awarding the applicant 8,000 EUR in 
compensation. 
This case presented the first occasion for the Court to enforce the principle on the 
right to access to health records connected with the exercise of dangerous activities, 
firstly established in the context of the right to life with the decision of LCB v UK.447 
In that case, the applicant claimed that the State's failure to warn her parents of the 
possible health risks caused by her father's participation in nuclear tests had given rise 
to a violation of Article 2.448 The Court acknowledged that 'if, on the basis of the 
information available to the State at the time in question, it had appeared likely that 
exposure of the applicant's father to radiation might have caused a real risk to her 
health, then the United Kingdom would have been required to act on its own motion 
to advise her parents and monitor her health. ' 449 The Court was not satisfied that, on 
the facts of the case, the applicant had proved a causal link between the exposure of 
her father to radiation and her health conditions.450 Therefore the Court concluded 
that, given the information available to the State at the relevant time, it could not have 
been expected to act of its own motion to notify the applicant's parents of the risks 
nor to take any other special action in relation to her. 
Although the claim was unsuccessful, this judgment set a precedent for the 
configuration of a positive obligation on State authorities to provide information 
necessary to the protection of rights under Article 2. The implementation of this 
principle led to a positive outcome in the case of 6neryzldzz v. Turkey, discussed 
earlier in this paper.451 There the Court established that public authorities were 
required to take measures to prevent infringement of the right to life as a result of 
exercise of dangerous activities such as waste storage. In the Court's opinion, this 
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involved, inter alia, putting in place measures granting public access to information 
concerning the exercise of these activities, extending to Article 2 the principles 
elaborated in the context of Article 8, 'particularly as this interpretation is supported 
by current developments in European standards. ' 452 
The Court observed that the Government had not provided local inhabitants with 
information enabling them to assess the risks they might run as a result of living 
where they did. 453 The Court concluded that this factor, together with the negligent 
conduct of the State's authorities, had led to a violation of Article 2 in its substantive 
aspect. 454 
Albeit the Court's case law on access to information does not have environmental 
content stricto sensu, these precedents may be regarded as useful tools for the pursuit 
of information in matters of public health, which may prove of service in the 
protection of environmental interests, enabling to scrutinize the exercise of hazardous 
activities and the enforcement of environmental legislation. 
Freedom of expression 
Although not specifically relevant in terms of access to environmental information, 
the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention has also met 
some interesting environmental developments. The norm protects the right of the 
individual to receive and impart information against interference by public authorities. 
Freedom of expression is also relevant when a private party takes legal action against 
another to prevent the distribution of information. Restrictions to this right must be 
prescribed by law and follow a legitimate aim. Furthermore, a fair balance must be 
struck between the interest of the individual and that of the community as a whole. 
The right to distribute information on environmental matters has been found to fall 
within the ambit of application of Article 10. Thus in Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs v 
Latvia,455 an environmental NGO claimed that a legal suit for defamation resulting 
from one of its campaigns had violated its freedom of expression. The dispute related 
to the publication of an article expressing the organization's concerns about the 
conservation of coastal dunes on a stretch of the Latvian coast. The article argued that 
the local mayor had 'signed illegal documents, decisions and certificates' and had 
wilfully omitted to comply with the relevant authorities' instructions to halt illegal 
building works. The mayor had sued the organization in defamation. Despite having 
proved the well-foundedness of its factual allegation, the NGO was ordered to publish 
an official apology and to pay damage, as the publication had attacked the mayor in 
person for the acts of the entire local authority. The applicant organisation complained 
that this judgment had infringed the right to freedom of expression and in particular 
the right to impart information, as guaranteed by Article 10. 
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The Court observed that the order against the applicant amounted to an interference 
with the exercise of its right to freedom of expression. That interference was 
prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim such as the protection of the 
reputation and rights of others. As it went on to consider whether a fair balance had 
been struck between the competing interests, the Court noted that the applicant 
organisation had acted with intent to draw attention to a sensitive issue of public 
interest. In the Court's opinion, criticism of the mayor for the policy of an entire local 
authority could not be regarded as an abuse of the freedom of expression. 
Furthermore, the Court asserted that public authorities were to be exposed to 
permanent scrutiny by citizens in a democratic society and that everyone should be 
able to draw the public's attention to situations they considered unlawful.456 
Consequently, despite the discretion afforded to national authorities, the Court found 
that there had not been a reasonable balance between the restrictions imposed on the 
applicant organisation's freedom of expression and the legitimate aim pursued.457 The 
Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 and awarded to the 
applicant organization 3,000 EUR for non-pecuniary damage and 1,000 EUR for costs 
and expenses. 
This decision constitutes a significant step in the protection of democratic debate on 
environmental issues, safeguarding the right of NGOs to campaign freely. The same 
principle was established in Steel and Morris v. UK. 458 As recalled earlier in this 
Chapter,459 the applicants maintained that their campaign against McDonald had 
raised matters of public interest that were to be freely and openly discussed in a 
democracy. Accordingly, they claimed that the domestic courts' finding of their 
liability for defamation had been contrary to freedom of expression provided by the 
Convention.460 
The Court found that there had been an interference with the applicants' rights under 
Article 10 and that this had taken place in accordance with the law. 461 The Court, 
however, considered that this interference could not be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society. In this respect, the Court observed that the general interest in 
promoting the free circulation of information and ideas about the activities of 
powerful commercial entities was an important factor to be taken into account in this 
context. In particular, the Court asserted that the inequality of arms and the difficulties 
under which the applicants laboured were significant in assessing the proportionality 
of interference under Article 10.462 Accordingly, the Court concluded that domestic 
authorities had not struck a correct balance between the need to protect the applicants' 
freedom of expression and the need to protect McDonald's reputation, thereby 
violating the applicants' rights under Article 10.463 
456 Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs v Latvia, at 42. 
457 Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs v Latvia, at 49. 
458 Steel and Morris v. UK, Application No. 68416/0 I. 
459 Cf retro, p. 67. 
460 Steel and Morris v. UK, at 78. 
461 Steel and Morris v. UK, at 86- 87. 
462 Steel and Morris v. UK, at 95. 
463 Steel and Morris v. UK, at 96. 
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Some conclusions 
The European Convention of Human Rights provides a series of procedural 
guarantees that may find useful deployment with reference to environmental interests. 
First of all, numerous domestic legal systems provide public law litigation and class 
actions aimed to supplementing and scrutinizing governmental action in 
environmental matters. The procedural guarantees associated with Article 6 may offer 
precious support to these undertakings. In particular, applicants may invoke the 
protection of the Convention in order to have their environmental claims adequately 
heard, in so far as they rely on civil rights protected by domestic law. Article 13, on 
the other hand, supplies the right to access to an effective remedy whenever 
environmental interests are intertwined with one of the rights protected by the 
Convention, such as the right to life or the right to respect of one's home and family 
life. In both cases, the possibility to rely on the Convention in subject to precise limits 
and applications that transcend them are destined to fail. 
The right of access to information in environmental matters has been found to be a 
procedural implication of some substantive rights protected by the Convention. In 
particular, the Court has interpreted States' positive obligations under Articles 8 and 2 
in the sense of including the duty to provide information enabling individuals to 
assess the risks associated with the exercise of hazardous activities.464 These findings 
may allow improved public scrutiny on the exercise of hazardous activities and the 
enforcement of environmental legislation. Furthermore, the Court has proved willing 
to protect NGOs freedom of expression in the circulation of information and ideas 
about the activities of commercial and governmental entities, as well as their equality 
of arms in legal suits for defamation.465 In these limited perspectives, the procedural 
guarantees provided by the Convention may serve to the protection of some 
environmental interests, supplying a forum where citizens may obtain the 
enforcement of environmental regulations. 
464 Guerra and others v Italy, cit., at 60, bneryildiz v. Turkey, cit., at 71; LCB v UK, cit., at 38; Roche v UK, at 
161. 
465 Vides Aizsardzibas K1ubs v Latvia, cit., at 49; Steel and Morris v. UK, cit., at 72 and 98. 
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5. Conclusions 
The present paper aimed to analyze the means of environmental protection available 
within the framework of the European Convention of Human Rights. As recalled 
earlier, the link between human rights and environmental protection is justified by the 
intent of joining efforts. Improved environmental conditions may contribute to the 
fulfilment of human rights standards; meanwhile the achievement of a high level of 
compliance with human rights law is susceptible of ensuring better environmental 
protection. In the perspective of existing law, failure to tackle environmental degrade 
may result in the violation of some human rights that depend upon certain 
environmental characteristics. In this connection, State s' implementation of the 
commitments they have already made may ensure better environmental protection, as 
a logical corollary of human rights obligations.466 
Although the European Convention of Human Rights does not contain any explicit 
reference to the environment or to environmental rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights' recent case law has taken some significant steps in this direction. The 
Court's initiative has been supported by the Council of Europe through the 
publication of the Manual on Human Rights and the Environment. 467 Thus, aside from 
the perspective of introducing a specific human right to a healthy environment, the 
Council of Europe has left it to the Court to establish the circumstances under which 
environmental interests may obtain protection within the framework of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
Initially the Court displayed a fairly restrictive approach to environmental claims, 
rejecting them as incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae. Over the years, 
however, there has been an increasing acknowledgment that some of the rights 
protected by the Convention may have an environmental dimension. 
First of all, the right to respect for one's home, private and family life may be 
decisively impaired by environmental conditions. The jurisprudence on the matter is 
well-established and the Court has extended the notion of interference under Article 8 
to a number of environmentally sensitive intrusions, such as excessive noise levels, 
fumes, smells and toxic emissions. Early decisions have acknowledged that positive 
obligations incumbent upon national authorities require the existence and effective 
implementation of appropriate domestic standards protecting against these 
intrusions.468 Later decisions have brought further evolutions, as the Court identified 
with greater precision the factors relevant to the application of Article 8, proving more 
willing to require States to provide justification for their environmental policies.469 
The Court has acknowledged the link between environmental conditions and the full 
enjoyment of the right to life only in one crucial precedent,470 where it found that 
466 Cf. M. ANDERSON, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: an Overview, in M. 
ANDERSON, A. BOYLE eds., Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996, p. 8. 
467 In particular, the Manual prologue expressly mentions that 'the existing case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights demonstrates that ·the Convention already offers a certain degree of protection in relation to 
environmental issues through existing Convention rights and their interpretation in the case-law of the Court'. Cf. 
Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, cit., at 2. 
468 Cf. L6pez-Ostra v Spain and Guerra and others v Italy, cf. retro, Chapter 2. 
469 Fadeyeva v Russia, at I 05; Taskin and others v Turkey, at 117; Onerytldtz v. Turkey, GC, at I 07. 
470 Oneryildtz v. Turkey, cf. retro, Chapter 3. 
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positive obligations under Article 2 include putting in place legislative and 
administrative frameworks governing the exercise of dangerous activities, together 
with procedures granting public access to information and identifying shortcomings in 
the exercise of such activities.471 The right to life may therefore be deployed to 
complain against domestic authorities' failure to implement environmental 
regulations, as far as they are aimed at protecting from serious risk to human life. 
Also the procedural rights protected by the Convention have found some application 
in environmental cases. In particular, the Court has applied the procedural guarantees 
under Article 6 to claims grounded on domestic rights to a healthy environment, 
provided that the applicants' locus standi had been acknowledged by national courts. 
On the other hand, the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 has been found to 
apply to environmental cases whenever it is possible to establish a link with a 
substantive right protected under the Convention. 
Additionally, the Court's recent case law has placed considerable emphasis on the 
right to information. The substantive rights contained in the Convention have been 
increasingly interpreted in the sense to include procedural guarantees requiring State 
authorities to supply information on a number of environmentally sensitive issues, 
such as the exercise of dangerous activities. 472 The Court has further proved willing to 
protect environmental campaigners' freedom of expression in the circulation of 
information and ideas about the activities of corporations and governmental bodies,473 
as well as the right to enjoy equality of arms in law suits for defamation. 
The new jurisprudence poses crucial questions on the interpretation of the Convention 
and the admissibility requirements to bring a case to the Court. The most salient 
feature is the consistent dilution of the victim requirement under Article 34, which has 
been widened, allowing a larger number of applicants to bring successful 
environmental claims under the Convention. As recalled earlier, the Court supplies a 
fundamentally repressive system, aimed to remedy violations of human rights and 
only exceptionally to prevent them. However, in the protection of environmental 
resources, which are often irreplaceable, preventative action is of fundamental 
importance. 
The Court's initial line was to require reasonable and convincing evidence of the 
probability of the occurrence of a violation concerning the applicants personally, as 
mere suspicions or conjectures were not enough.474 This high threshold allowed the 
protection of environmental interests only in cases where material damage to the 
applicant's personal sphere had already occurred,475 preventing the application of the 
Convention to cases where the damage was merely potential476 or the causal link could 
was not univocal.477 
471 Onerylidtz v. Turkey, GC, at 89-90. 
472 Onerytldtz v. Turkey, GC, cf. Chapter 3; Guerra and others v Italy, cf. Chapter 2; Roche v UK, cf. Chapter 4. 
473 Vides Aizsardzibas Klubs v Latvia; Steel and Morris v UK, cf. Chapter 4. 
474 Asselbourg v Luxembourg, cit., at I. 
475 Cf. e.g. Lopez Ostra v Spain. 
476 Cf. Balmer-Schafroth and others v Switzerland; Asselbourg v Luxembourg; Athanassoglou and others v 
Switzerland. 
477 Cf. Tauria and others v France; LCB v UK. 
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Later jurisprudence has progressively eroded these criteria, as the Court has instituted 
a twofold approach to environmental cases. Where applicants are unable to obtain any 
recognition of their rights at the domestic level, the Court demands that they prove a 
certain prejudice within their personal sphere.478 Where applicants have obtained the 
acknowledgement of their rights by domestic courts, on the other hand, the Court does 
not ask applicants to demonstrate a serious, specific and imminent danger, being 
satisfied by the assessment carried about by domestic courts in this respect.479 
Most importantly, the decision of Fadeyeva v Russia has supplied a pioneering 
solution to the question of evidence, establishing the applicant's victim status on 
indirect evidence and presumptions resulting from breach of domestic legislation and 
lack of cooperation on part of the defendant State.480 The causal jump done by the 
Court makes it easier for applicants to claim that their rights have been breached 
whenever domestic authorities prove uncooperative. These findings are particularly 
remarkable if one considers that in environmental cases the class of potentially 
affected individuals is usually large. 4H1 Furthermore, the Court's progressive 
interpretation may spread to other provisions under the Convention, such as the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment and the prohibition of 
discrimination.482 It now remains to be seen how this jurisprudence will be affected by 
the new admissibility criteria set out in Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, which 
require a significant disadvantage in the applicant's personal sphere.483 
Environmental law does not suffer from lack of regulation, but rather of its 
enforcement. The European Court of Human Rights is susceptible of playing an 
increasingly important role in the implementation of environmental standards, 
working as a supplement to national measures and stimulus to pre-emptive action by 
States. Bringing environmental interests within this framework can offer a clear 
procedural advantage to complainants at the international level, supplying a forum for 
redress and even precautionary remedies for victims of environmental abuse. This 
may only happen in the limited instances where environmental interests may be 
translated into human rights claims. 
The standards discovered in human rights instruments cannot stand as a substitute for 
a proper regime for the protection of the environment and some environmental 
interests escape protection altogether, unless States have already taken the initiative to 
create rights in national law. Even then, the protection obtained by way of human 
rights law would be procedural rather than substantive. Nonetheless, we should not 
underestimate what measures human rights law can supply, nor their capacity for 
development as the cases considered in this thesis quite clearly show. It is therefore 
478 Cf. L6pez-Ostra v Spain and, more recently, Moreno Gomez v Spain. 
479 Cf. Taskin and others v Turkey; Fadeyeva v Russia; Ofi:kan and others v Turkey; Okyay and others v Turkey. 
48° Fadeyeva v Russia, at 80. 
481 Cf. the cases Taskin and others v Turkey Ofi:kan and others v Turkey, Chapter 2. Cf. also the cases of Mrs. 
Fadeyeva's fellow citizens: Ledyayeva v Russia, Application No. 53157/99, currently pending; Dobrokhoytova v 
Russia,-Application No. 53247/99, currently pending; Zolorateva v Russia, Application No. 53695/00, currently 
pending; Romashina v Russia, Application No. 56850/00, currently pending. 
482 Cf. Selmouni v. France, Application No. 25803/94, at 10 I: 'the increasingly high standard being required in the 
area of the protection of human rights and ftmdamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater 
firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.' 
483 On Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, Cf. retro, Chapter I. 
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commendable that environmental lawyers are aware of the avenues available in this 
perspective, in order to exploit them fully, when feasible. 
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